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THE ULTIMATE FICTION
By ALICE AUSTIN SOLED*
Mrs. Soled contends that the very existence of "legal fictions"
is the ultimate fiction. She examines the traditional axiomatic propo-
sitions that legal fictions exist and that legal fictions are not real,
contending that these traditional conceptualizations result in many
factual situations being paradoxically characterized as illegal, al-
though simultaneously being treated as if they were legal. She illus-
trates the confusion involved in the application of legal fictions in
the areas of corporate law, public offices and legislatures, divorce,
and international recognition. In Mrs. Soled's analysis the confusion
surrounding the application of legal fiction in all of these areas
results from the basic assumption that law is based upon objective
reality. She denies the relevance of the distinction between "reality"
and "fiction" insofar as the law is concerned, and starting with the
assumption that law is based upon "subjective reality" proposes an
alternative conceptualization, relative recognition, which avoids the
logical pitfalls of traditional analysis.
T HE EXISTENCE of "legal fictions"** is an axiom of legal
theory.1 It is the inevitable complement of the axiom that the
Law is constructed upon objective reality.' Both axioms are common
to almost all concepts of the law.' Both also are fallacious.
Coexistent with these fallacies, and dependent for its continued
existence upon them, is a conceptual confusion as to the meaning
attributable to "Law," for the purpose of applying the terms "legal,"
"legality," "illegal," and "illegality." This confusion has generated
the juristic classification of factual situations as (1) legal; or (2)
illegal; or (3) illegal, but treated as legal, i.e., simultaneously legal
and illegal. This categorization is doubly objectionable: First, it
postulates a paradox- the synonymity of the antonymous concepts
"legality" and "illegality." Second, it involves a misconception as
to the nature of the analysis to be made.
Acknowledgment that the Law is a creature of subjective reality,
necessarily will result in clarification of the meaning attributable to
"Law" in the above context. The effect of this elucidation will be
to rectify the prevalent error as to the character of the analysis which
should be made.
*Admitted to the New York Bar in 1955 and to the Michigan Bar in 1957; J.D.,
University of Michigan, 1955; J.S.D. candidate, Columbia University.
**All words or phrases enclosed in quotation marks upon their first appearance in this
article shall be read as if so enclosed upon all subsequent appearances herein.
'See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 32-41, 312-22 (1949); J. GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 30-64 (2d ed. 1927); P. TOURTOULON, PHI-
LOSOPHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 294-300, 383-99 (1922); Fuller, Legal
Fictions (pts. 1-3), 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 513, 877 (1930-1931).
2 See note 1 supra.
3 See, e.g., J. GRAY, supra note 1, chs. II & IV; Fuller, supra note 1
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I. THE LAW Is PREMISED UPON SUBJECTIVE REALITY.
Many and varied are the definitions of the "Law." At one end
of the spectrum is the theory that "[t]he Law ... is identical with
the rules laid down by the judges, but those rules are laid down by
the judges because they are the Law, they are not the Law because
they are laid down by the judges... ,,,4 i.e. "the judges discover
pre-existing Law .... "I At the other end of the spectrum is the
hypothesis that '{the Law . . . is composed of the rules which the
courts, that is, the judicial organs . . . lay down for the determina-
tion of legal rights and duties. ' 6 In other words, "the Law is the
body of rules which the courts... apply in deciding cases."' Between
these two extremes lies Austin's definition of Law as commands of
the sovereign.' Also in the median range, is the supposition that
"the courts, in deciding cases, are, in truth, applying what has pre-
viously existed in the common consciousness of the people."9
Common to all these concepts of the Law is the axiom that
"legal fictions" exist.1" According to Fuller, for example:
Probably no lawyer would deny that judges and writers on legal
topics frequently make statements which they know to be false.
These statements are called "fictions." There is scarcely a field of
the law in which one does not encounter one after another of these
conceits of the legal imagination. . . . Even the austere science of
Jurisprudence has not found it possible to dispense with fiction.
The influence of the fiction extends to every department of the
jurist's activities. 1'
Similarly, according to Tourtoulon, "juridical logic often as-
serts what is false .... The fiction is the algebra of law, and a pic-
turesque form of algebra besides."'" Tourtoulon further states:
[T]he fiction has played a part in law exactly identical with that
of the metaphor in language. A whole world of fiction has gone
toward the making of juridical ideas which seem to us most prac-
tical and familiar. The legal systems which were the richest in
4 J. GRAY, supra note 1, at 93.
5Id. at 96. See also SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 161 (M.
Hall ed. 1947): "The old Blackstonian theory of pre-existing rules of law which
judges found, but did not make .... ; J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 32.
6 J. GRAY, supra note 1, at 84.
7 1d. at 110. See also SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, supra
note 5, at 158: "The theory of the older writers . . . was that judges did not legislate
at all. A pre-existing rule was there .... From holding that the law is never made
by judges, the votaries of the Austinian analysis have been led at times to the con-
clusion that it is never made by anyone else." J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 33; W.
FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 218-19 (4th ed. 1960) ; J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE
§ 20 (7th ed. 1924).
8 1 J. AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1873) ; W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 7, at 211-
13; J. GRAY, supra note 1, at 85.
9 J. GRAY, supra note 1, at 89.
10 Note 1 supra.
'I Fuller, supra note 1, at 363.
12P. TOURTOULON, supra note 1, at 385.
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imagery at their origin are today the richest in precise and learned
conceptions, and it was by passing from fiction to fiction that their
most important progress has been realized.... The oldest and most
essential ideas are nearly all, if not all, fictitious.' 3
Although it is considered axiomatic that there are such creatures
as legal fictions, it is asserted, with equal dogmatism, that legal fic-
tions are not real.' 4 This is true even of those who maintain that the
law consists of the rules recognized and applied by judges in de-
ciding cases.' 5 Thus, it has been said:
One who employs a fiction makes a statement which deviates from
or contradicts reality, but with full awareness of this deviation or
contradiction .... The chief characteristics of a fiction are .. [ ilts
arbitrary deviation from reality .... Fictions are "assumptions made
with a full realization of the impossibility of the thing assumed."
• . . One must guard against the vice of assuming that, because a
fiction is useful, it therefore has objective validity. "The gulf be-
tween reality and fiction must always be stressed"; one must avoid
"the fundamental error of converting fictions into reality."' 6
Common definitions of "legal fictions" explicitly assume that
such fictions are not real. A legal fiction has been defined as "[ain
assumption of a possible thing as a fact irrespective of the question
of its truth .... 17 It further has been described as a "statement made
with full consciousness, at the moment of utterance, that it does not
correspond to the truth of the matter ... ."I8 Tourtoulon has stated
that "the fiction is the enunciation of a fact which is false and is
recognized and presented as false .... The juridical nature of all of
these assertions is identical; when one enunciates them without being
his own dupe or wishing to dupe others, a fiction is created.' '" 9
"Reality" commonly is defined as the "[sltate, character, quality,
or fact of being real, existent . . . or of having real being or exist-
ence . . . . That which actually exists, that which is not imagination,
fiction or pretense . . 20 It would appear, therefore, that by defi-
tion, fictions cannot be considered as real. For the concept of "fiction"
exists only as a correlative of the concept of "reality." Yet, as a
matter of semantics, "reality" has a dual connotation. In common
usage, "reality" is understood to denote objective reality - "That
which actually exists . . . that which has objective existence, and is
1 Id. at 387.
14 Note 1 supra.
15 J. FRANK, supra note 1; J. GRA, supra note 1.
16 J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 312. See also P. ToURTOULON, supra note 1, at 385:
-[T]he fiction does falsify reality .... "
17WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 940 (Fiction) (2d ed. unabr. 1937).
18J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 312.
P. TOuRTOULON, supra note 1, at 384. Cf. Fuller, supra note 1, at 369: "A fiction
is either, (1) a statement propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its
falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility."
20 WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2072 (Reality) (2d ed. unabr. 1937).
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not merely an idea."'" "Reality," however, also can be subjective
in nature. Subjective reality is "reality as perceived or known as
opposed to reality as independent of mind .... 2 The concept of
.'subjective reality" is expressed most succinctly as esse est percipi -
to be is to be perceived.23 In other words, subjective reality is that
which is perceived or recognized as having actual existence.24 Since
the relationship of legal fictions to reality customarily is defined only
in terms of objective reality, 25 the fact that the concepts of "legal
fictions" and "reality" are considered to be mutually exclusive2" is
not determinative of whether legal fictions are real. For, the concept
of "fiction" is correlative only to the concept of "objective reality."27
Thus, definition of legal fictions in terms of objective reality
is required only by, and dependent upon, the assumption that the
Law is based upon objective reality - that there is such an animal
as an "objective legal truth."2" Yet, the very writers who postulate the
Law to be constructed upon objective reality state categorically that
it is, in fact, constructed upon legal fictions.29 The argument, how-
ever, is presented most cogently by Tourtoulon, 30 who observes:
[VJery old fictions are no longer considered as such. All of our
institutions were of a fictitious character originally; if one would
try to strip the Law of every fiction of the past as well as of the
21 d.
22WESTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 992 (Subjective) (5th ed. 1946). See also
Idealism.
23 This concept also is known as Berkleianism, in honor of its proud parent, George
Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. See B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
648 et seq. (1961).
24
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2072 (Reality), 2510 (Subjective), 1815
(Perceive), 520 (Cognizance) (2d ed. unabr. 1937).
2WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2072 (Reality) (2d ed. unabr. 1937).
26J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 312; WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2072 (Reality)
(2d ed. unabr. 1937).
27 WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2072 (Reality) (2d ed. unabr. 1937). See also
authorities cited note 1 supra.
28 See J. FRANK, supra note 1; P. TOURTOULON, Supra note 1 ; WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L
DICTIONARY 2072 (Reality) (2d ed. unabr. 1937). Frank, for example, states, supra
at 37, that "[l]egal fictions are mistaken for objective legal truths ......
29J. FRANK, supra note 1; J. GRAY, supra note 1. Gray, for example, observes, supra
at 31, 34, and 35, that "[f]ictions have played an important part in the administra-
tion of the Law in England .... There was no lack of other fictions in the English
Law, in the shape of allegations which one of the parties made and the other was
not allowed to deny, in order that the wine of new law might be put into the bottles
of old procedure. , . . Such fictions are scaffolding, - useful, almost necessary, in
construction ...." Frank comments, supra at 40: "Neither in law nor elsewhere
could we afford to do away with fictional contrivances." In addition, Frank, supra
at 39, quotes Bentham's vituperative views on "legal fictions": " 'Lying, he might
have said, without any such hyperbole -lying and nonsense compose the ground-
work of English Judicature. . . .In English law, fiction is a syphilis which runs in
every vein, and carries into every part of the system the principle of rottenness.' "
See also R. POUND, THE SPIIUT OF THE COMMON LAW 166-73 (1921); Fuller,
supra note 1.
30 Who, it should be noted, considers it to be a "strange delusion that the law can be
constructed upon objective realities." P. TOURTOULON, supra note 1, at 295.
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present, not much would be left.8 ' [He further observes that] [ilt
would not therefore be inaccurate to claim that our reality is simply
fiction differentiated, and that at bottom all law is reduced to a
series of fictions heaped one upon another in successive layers.32
Once it is recognized that the Law is constructed upon legal
fictions, as opposed to objective reality, the true relation of legal
fictions to legal reality becomes apparent.
Subjective reality is that which is perceived or recognized as
having actual existence.8" A legal fiction is the enunciation of a fact
which is or may be false, but which the Law recognizes as having
actual existence. 4 Therefore, legal fictions are subjectively real.
Since the Law is constructed upon legal fictions, 5 and legal
fictions are subjectively real, the Law is constructed upon subjective
reality.
Recognition of subjective reality as the substratum of the Law
is implicit in discussion of "legal fictions" qua "fictions." 6 Thus,
Tourtoulon:
Finally, precisely because the fiction does falsify reality, it frequently
happens that it is very strictly and subjectively exact, much more
strictly so than any other form of thought expression .... A fiction,
be it understood, is only a juridical "construction" like any other
... . In any case, one must steer clear of the belief that a fictitious
construction is opposed to a real one. Every juridical construction
is simply a question of form, hence arbitrary and artificial. The
fiction is a form created by the imagination .... [L]ogically, it is
absolutely identical with any other form.
8 7
Timberg, moreover, observes that "[o]ur knowledge of all
'reality' is largely referential and symbolic, and fictions, therefore,
necessary logical expedients on which we must rely." ' He also
quotes from The Philosophy of As If, by Vaihinger: "'A fiction can
31 Id. at 388.
2 Id. at 387.
33 See note 24 supra.
34 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 772 (Fiction) (3d ed. 1933). This premise has been
stated: Fictio est contra veritatem, sed pro veritate habetur. (Fiction is against the
truth, but it is to be esteemed truth.)
3See notes 29, 31, 32 supra.
s6 See J. FRANK, supra note 1; P. TOURTOULON, supra note 1; Fuller, supra note 1;
Timberg, Corporate Fictions, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 533, 540 et. seq. (1946).
37 P. ToURTOULON, suPra note 1, at 385, 391. Similarly, Patterson relates that Professor
Dewey told his students "that, logically speaking, a fact and a fiction are the same."
Pragmatism As a Philosophy of Law, reprinted from THE PHILOSOPHER OF THE
COMMON MAN 181 (1940). Patterson further stated, at 224 of An Introduction to
Jurisprudence (4th mimeographed ed. 1951 ): "We call a 'legal fiction' any affirmation
that a certain symbol (word or phrase) that is connotative in a legal context
has a denotative reference that contradicts the denotative reference of the same symbol
in some other context, usually that of popular language. Thus the affirmation that
'husband and wife are one person' in the English common law had a considerable
variety of legal consequences, and in that context it was a warranted ('true') asser-
tion. Thus Professor Dewey said that in that context it was a 'legal fact'. Only when
we transfer the affirmation to another context does it become fictitious."
38 Timberg, supra note 36, at 541.
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be substituted for the actual world . .. but it is not a picture of true
reality, it is only a sign used in order to deal with reality, a logical
expedient devised to enable us to move about and act in the real
world.' "3
Frank, by tacitly acknowledging the subjective reality of legal
fictions, also accords implicit recognition to subjective reality as the
foundation of the Law.4" Although he approves Vaihinger's thesis
that "[o]ne must guard against the vice of assuming that, because
a fiction is useful, it therefore has objective validity, ' 41 he refers,
several times, to the existence of "valid fictions. ' 42 Since "validity"
connotes "reality,"4 Frank must be presumed to be acknowledging
the non-objective, or subjective, reality of fictions.
Recognition of subjective reality as the substratum of the Law
is explicit, as well as implicit. Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law cate-
gorically denies the existence, in Law, of objective facts: Law is based
solely upon subjective facts, upon only those facts recognized as
such by the Law.44 In other words,
In the world of law, there is no fact "in itself," no "absolute"
fact, there are only facts ascertained by a competent organ in a pro-
cedure prescribed by law .... It is a typical layman's opinion that
there are absolute, immediately evident facts. Only by being first
ascertained through a legal procedure are facts brought into the
sphere of law or do they, so to speak, come into existence within
this sphere. Formulating this in a somewhat paradoxically painted
way, we could say that the competent organ ascertaining the con-
ditioning facts legally "creates" these facts.
45
Similarly, N~kam states:
There is no exterior reality, no absolute fact, no natural rela-
tion, which by itself could necessarily enter into the system of the
law, or could have any legal significance merely because of its ex-
perimental existence, or could become what might be called "legal
reality' .. . 4
Law must somehow correspond to reality .... But the reality of
law . . . cannot consist of its concepts being present as, or repre-
sented and determined by, the experimental realities of the outside
world. Its reality is entirely subjective.
47
391d. n.36.
" Note 29 supra.
41 J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 312.
421d. at 37, 320. "This is not the place to discuss at length the immense importance of
valid fictions. Suffice it to say that valid fictions . . . are invaluable."
43 WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1105 (Validity), 1075 (Truth) (5th ed.
1946).
44
H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (A. Wedberg transl. 1961).
4Id. at 135-36.




[E]verything which is reality in the world of the law is such
only because the law created it .... 48
Since the concept "legal fiction" can be conceived only as a
correlative of the concept "objective legal reality," recognition that
the Law is founded upon subjective reality should result in the
elimination of the phrase "legal fictions," from legal vocabulary
and thought. Nevertheless, writers in the area have clung as tenaci-
ously to the concept of legal fictions as a bulldog to the throat of
his prey. Fuller, for example, considers a complete elimination of
legal fictions to be impossible.4' Frank asserts the existence of "valid
fictions."50 And Tourtoulon avers that "juridical theory is all the
more objective when it presents itself as fictitious, and all the more
delusive when it claims to do without fictions."'" Tourtoulon's in-
ability to relinquish this conceptual pacifier is peculiarly difficult to
comprehend, in view of his acknowledgment that "[a] fiction ...
is only a juridical 'construction' like any other .... In any case, one
must steer clear of the belief that a fictitious construction is opposed
to a real one."52
This recalcitrance must be overcome. Existence of legal fictions
is the ultimate fiction. Toleration of this concept generates confusion
and the proliferation of paradoxes. It is improper, as well as errone-
ous, to distinguish between objective and subjective reality in the
context of Law. For the Law recognizes only subjective facts, "cre-
ated" by the "competent organ ascertaining" them5" - objective facts
exist, in Law, only to the extent that they are recognized so to exist."
4
Conversely, all that the Law recognizes to exist has legal reality.
Thus, Tourtoulon's phrase, "juridical constructions, "" is the most
appropriate one for all facts recognized as such in Law.
4 Id. at 64.
49 Fuller, supra note 1, at 378.
Conceivably we might eliminate the pretense from all our fictions; we might
cease to say, "A is legally treated as if it were B," and simply say, "In a
technical sense, A is B".... This attitude has, indeed, been dignified by a
name- "the theory of the juristic truth of fictions."
But it is clear enough that such a wholesale process of redefinition
could not be carried out. One cannot introduce sweeping changes in linguis.
tic usage by an arbitrary fiat.
5oSee note 42 supra.
51 P. TOURTOULON, supra note 1, at 295.
52 Id. at 391.
5 H. KELSEN, supra note 44, at 135-36.
5
4 Id.
55 P. TOURTOULON, supra note 1, at 391. Cf. Fuller, supra note 1, at 908-09: "All of our
facts... are conceptual facts .... Our language, our 'common sense' notions, our
scientific theories, our legal constructs - all of these are conceptual devices for
dealing with and simplifying reality. 'Facts' are only those thought-constructs which
are useful for so many purposes and are so commonly accepted that no one doubts
their 'existence' or 'reality'. ... When we say that a fiction 'changes the facts to fit
the theory', what we usually mean is that in adjusting our conceptual apparatus to




II. LEGAL CONCEPTUALISM - A PROCRUSTEAN INCUBUS
Common to all theories of the legal process is a quadripartite
sequence:56 First, the existence of facts is determined by the com-
petent authority. 7 Second, this competent authority recognizes or
determines the rules applicable to the facts as ascertained. These
rules express legal concepts. Third, this competent authority applies
these rules to the facts. "8 Fourth, this process of application pro-
duces legal consequences " - the attribution, or non-attribution, to
a factual situation of the essential characteristics of the legal con-
cepts formulated in the second stage of the legal process.
Legal consequences which realize these legal concepts are char-
acterizable by the quality of legality - "the quality of being legal";60
"conforming to the law; . . . required or permitted by law; . . . good
and effectual in law . . . [pjroper or sufficient to be recognized by
the law.""1
Legal consequences which fail to realize these legal concepts,
in any manner, are characterizable by the quality of illegality - "the
quality of being illegal";62 "contrary to law"; 68 "not according to
or authorized by, law.'"'"
"Legality" and "illegality" are antonymous. Assertions that
they coexist are, therefore, paradoxical. Yet the possibility of their
coexistence is postulated by legal theory, which asserts that a factual
situation may be characterized as illegal although it is treated as if
it were legal.6" This assertion occurs only where the inherent qual-
ities of a legal concept are attributed to a factual situation which
does not conform ideally to the conditions deemed requisite for
realization of the concept. Elimination of this paradox is a two-step
process. Acknowledgment that that which the competent authority
5See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (Law) (3d ed. 1933) ; 1 J. AUSTIN, supra note 8;
W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 7; J. GRAY, supra note 1; H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW (1961); H. KELSEN, supra note 44; H. KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE? (1957).
57 These facts, as so determined, correspond to the Aristotelean "material cause." WEB-
STER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 427 (Cause) (2d ed. unabr. 1937). "[T~he material
cause, that which is to be wrought to this form, as the brick, timber, etc., of which
the house is to be constructed."
58The process of application corresponds to the Aristotelean efficient, or moving,
cause, "that which acts as the immediate agency for the production of the
effect." WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 427 (Cause) (2d ed. unabr. 1937).
5 These consequences correspond to the Aristotelean final cause: "that which is the end
or object of the process." ld. (Cause (4)). They consist in either realization, or
non-realization, of the idea, or legal concept, expressed in the rules determined in the
second stage of this sequence.
60 WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 572 (Legality) (5th ed. 1946).
61 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1085 '(Legal) (3d ed. 1933). See also WEBSTER'S NEW
INT'L DICTIONARY 1411 (Legal) (2d ed. unabr. 1937).
62 WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 496 (5th ed. 1946).
3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 916 (3d ed. 1933).
64 WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DCTIONARY 1241 (2d ed. unabr. 1937).
65 See pt. III infra.
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recognizes as legal can be characterized only as legal,6 is but half
the battle. It remains to establish that that which the competent
authority treats as legal, it recognizes as legal- that attribution of
the qualities of a concept necessarily involves its realization.
Determination of what constitutes recognition of legality de-
pends upon the meaning to be ascribed to "Law" in this context.
Broadly speaking, the Law consists of the rules formulated in the
second stage of the legal process."7 The legal concepts expressed
by these rules possess three aspects: (1) Each concept is an "idea"
denominative of the meaning of the universal term which it repre-
sents. 8 (2) Each concept also is a schematism, establishing and
classifying its constituents and the conditions requisite for their
realization, as well as determining the extent to which its qualities
must be attributed to each of its constituent classes.69 These classes
possess varying degrees of correspondence to the ideal form of the
concept. (3) Finally, each concept comprises the essential attributes
or inherent qualities of the idea whose meaning it represents.
70
Since the schematic and qualitative aspects of legal concepts
are correlative,7' those factual situations, to which the essential
attributes of these concepts are ascribed, must be presumed, con-
clusively, to meet their schematic requirements -i.e.. to realize
them.72 These factual situations thus conform to the law, and are
66 Pt. I supra; note 61 supra.
67 See, e.g., J. Salmond, as quoted in W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 7, at 219: -law con-
sists of the rules recognized and acted on by the courts of justice."
68 WEBSTER'S NEw INT'L DICTIONARY 552 (2d ed. unabr. 1937). [E.g., the term Cor-
poration designates the concept corporateness.] They are "the form or conception of
that which is to be, as it exists ideally." Id. (Cause (1)) (defining the Aris-
totelean formal cause). In this context, ideas are either Platonic archetypes or pat-
terns, or Aristotelean forms or form-giving causes. Id. at 1236 (Idea).
69 Id. at 1236 (Idea); see Pattern, Form, Schema, Schematic, Schematism. The concept
corporateness establishes three classes -corporation, de facto corporation, corpora-
tion by estoppel- specifies the circumstances which, in each case, require the attri-
bution of the qualities of corporateness, and specifies the extent thereof.
70 "[A3]U1 that is characteristically associated with, or suggested by" the generic term
denominating the classes which it comprehends. Id. at 552 (Concept). "The ideal or
intrinsic character of anything or that which imposes this character." WEBSTER'S COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 394 (Form '(3)) (5th ed. 1946). The concept corporateness
comprehends the essential characteristics of the generic term corporation.
7' Notes 68-70 supra. Cf. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAw Q.
REv. 37, 54 n.21 (1954): "It is also the explanation of the sense of a tertium quid
between the 'facts' and the 'legal consequences' which troubles the analysis of many
legal notions, e.g. status. The status of a slave is not (pace Austin) just a collective
name for his special rights and duties: there is a sense in which these are the 'conse-
quences' of his status ... ."
72 Notes 68-70 supra. See also Patterson, Introduction to Jurisprudence 96, 100 (4th
mimeographed ed. 1951): "A complete legal norm is one which designates more or
less precisely the legal consequences of operative facts.""'When we state that some




sufficient to be recognized by the law."8 In other words, attribution
of the qualities of a concept constitutes recognition of legality. This
attribution may be termed the consequences of legality, since it
necessarily involves realization of the concept. These factual situa-
tions therefore must be characterized as legal,"4 even when they
do not correspond to the conditions essential for realization of the
conceptual class which most nearly approximates the concept. Con-
versely, no factual situation which is treated as legal - to which
the consequences of legality are attributed - can be characterized
as illegal.
Failure to recognize the reciprocal relation of the schematic
and qualitative aspects of legal concepts results from the tauto-
typical nomenclature of these concepts- i.e., ascription to a legal
concept of a generic name identical with the specific name of one
of its component classes.75 This failure, in turn, causes the pro-
crustean equation of the genus with its denominative species. Con-
sequently, it is assumed that the characteristics, or inherent qualities,
of a legal concept can be attributed to a factual situation which
does not correspond to the conditions necessary for realization of
the concept. For example, designation of the concept of "corporate-
ness" by the specific appellation "corporation" results in a supposi-
tion that the whole is identical with one of its constituent parts,
that factual situations do not fulfill the requirements of corporate-
ness if they do not constitute a corporation. Yet, "corporation" is but
one class of corporateness, albeit the one which corresponds most
nearly to the schematic definition of the concept. Moreover, the
attributes of corporateness ai'e ascribed to factual situations which
are not classifiable as corporations.
Temptation to attribute illegality to factual situations which
are recognized as legal can be eliminated by adoption of a new
system of conceptual nomenclature. This system should denominate
legal concepts in qualitative terms which do not constitute tauto-
types. Assuredly there is as much need for precision in the Law
as in the natural sciences
7 6
73 See H. KELSEN, supra note 56; See authorities cited notes 68-70 supra. Cf. Hart,
note 71, at 56: "If we put aside the question 'What is a corporation?' and ask instead
'Under what types of conditions does the law ascribe liabilities to corporations?' this
is likely to clarify the actual working of a legal system."
74 Notes 60, 61 supra.
75 Invariably, the generic name applied to a legal concept is identical with the specific
name of the class which possesses the highest degree of correspondence to the con-
cept as a schematism.
76 Identity of generic and specific names is forbidden by the International Code of
Botanical Nomenclature. See WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2586 (Tautonym,
Tautotype) (2d ed. unabr. 1937).
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III. THE DE FACTO DOCTRINE- EXEMPLIFICATION
OF IDIOMATIC BIGOTRY
Many factual situations which give rise to the consequences of
legality are characterized as illegal. They are described, inter alia,
as de facto, voidable, legal by reason of res judicata or estoppel,
constructive, or implied. De facto denotes "an officer, a govern-
ment, a past action, or a state of affairs which must be accepted for
all practical purposes, but is illegal or illegitimate."77 De factoism
generally is justified in terms of public policy. "Voidable" signifies
that which is "valid and effectual until ... avoided by some act."
7
1
"Res judicata" and "estoppel" produce the consequences of legality
by interdicting the assertion of facts preclusive of realization of
the legal concept.79 The basis for these doctrines is that a party
should not be permitted to disavow his own conduct. "Constructive"
and "implied" denote "that which has not the character assigned to
it in its own essential nature, but acquires such character in conse-
quence of the way in which it is regarded by a rule or policy of law.'""
This terminology assumes three categories of juristic fact:
"legal," "illegal," and 'concurrently legal and illegal." The final
category encompasses all circumstances designated as de facto, void-
able, legal in consequence of res judicata or estoppel, constructive,
or implied. It may be designated "legal illegality."
A. Legal Illegality - the Dogma
Legal illegality establishes the conditions which necessitate the
ascription of the consequences of legality to factual situations which
do not correspond to the schematism of the denominative class of
the pertinent legal concept. It further identifies the persons who
are precluded from controverting the attribution of the consequences
of legality to these situations.
Legal illegality pervades the Law. It is, however, most con-
spicuous in connection with existence, or personality, and status.
The most prominent examples of this paradox are associated with
corporations, corporate officers and directors, public officers, legis-
latures, and divorce.
1. Corporations
"Corporation" is the ne plus ultra of legal tautotypes. Most
tautotypical legal nomenclature is simple, consisting in the ascrip-
tion to a legal concept of a generic name identical with the name
"7 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 513 (3d ed. 1933).
78 Id. at 1822 '(Void).
79 See G. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS: 112-14 (2d ed. 1951); WEBSTER'S NEw
INT'L DICTIONARY (Estoppel) (2d ed. unabr. 1937).
80 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 413 (Constructive) (3d ed. 1933).
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of one of its component species. "Corporation," however, is a com-
plex tautotype - a generic name identical both with the name of
one of its component species and with the name of one of its com-
ponent sub-species. To wit, "corporation" properly is the name of
but one of the species of the specific legal concept of "corporate-
ness," which, in turn, is but one of the species of the generic legal
concept of "artificial personality." Yet, as a general rule, it is pre-
sumed that the genus, the species, and the sub-species are mutually
identical. Hence, the qualities of both "artificial personality"'" and
'corporateness commonly are deemed attributable, strictly, only
to those factual situations which constitute corporations. In this
context, a "corporation" properly is considered to exist only if (1)
incorporation has been accomplished pursuant to statute;83 and (2)
the resultant institution is an entity distinct from its constituent
human beings, both as to the latter and as to third parties,8 4 possess-
ing at least the following powers, rights, and capacities:
1. To have perpetual succession .... 2. To sue or be sued, implead
or be impleaded, grant or receive, by its corporate name, and do all
other acts as natural persons may. 3. To purchase lands, and hold
them, for the benefit of themselves and their successors . . . 4. To
have a common seal .... 5. To make by-laws or private statutes for
the better government of the corporation .... 85
Although considerations of public policy necessitate exceptions
to the rule, these exceptions customarily are characterized as illegal,
notwithstanding the ascription to them, for certain purposes, of the
qualities of artificial personality or corporateness. 86 These excep-
tions fall into two categories. The first encompasses those institu-
tions which, although neither incorporated nor claiming to be corpo-
rations, are treated, for certain purposes, as entities distinct from
81 See 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 123, *467; L. GOWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN
COMPANY LAW 62, 68, 228-29 (1954) ; LLOYD, LAW OF UNINCORPORATED Asso-
CIATIONS (1938); F. MAITLAND, The Corporation Sole, The Unincorporate Body,
Trust and Corporation, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in SELECTED ESSAYS
(1936); WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION 10-12
(1929). Warren, for example, states: "According to Blackstone,....A legal unit
was either a natural person or it was not. If it was not, the proper name for it was
corporation." WARREN, supra at 10. Similarly, "[p]ersons are either natural or
artificial. The only natural persons are men. The only artificial persons are corpora-
tions." F. MAITLAND, supra at 73. And, likewise: "We in England say that persons
are natural or artificial, and that artificial persons are corporations aggregate or cor-
porations sole." Id. at 136.
82 
See I-I. BALLANTINE, MANUAL OF CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 19, 21-27
(1930); R. STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 26-29
(2d ed. 1949).
8 Authorities cited note 82 supra.
84 See Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566 (1870); LLOYD,
supra note 81, at 15-18.
851 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES **475-76.
8 8 See, e.g., H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82; W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING




their constituent human beings, because they rightfully possess one
or more of the powers, rights, and capacities "necessarily and in-
separably incident to every corporation. 8 7 These institutions all
are species of the generic legal concept "artificial personality," of
which "corporation" is the tautonym. They have been referred to,
inter alia, as "'de facto legal persons." '"8 The second category
encompasses those associations which are treated, for certain pur-
poses, as the corporations which they claim to be, although they
are neither incorporated, nor rightfully possess any inherently corpo-
rate powers, rights, or capacities. These associations are species of
the specific legal concept "corporateness." Consequently, they are
sub-species of the generic legal concept "artificial personality."
They have been referred to as de facto corporations, or as corpora-
tions by estoppel.
a. "Artificial Personality" - De facto Legal Persons
According to orthodox theory, "artificial personality" is a
monobasic concept, of which "corporation" is the solitary species.
This theory derives from the unfortunately deathless prose of
Blackstone, who stated:
Persons also are divided by the law into either natural persons, or
artificial. Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed
us; artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws for
the purposes of society and government, which are called corpora-
tions or bodies politic.8 9
Consequently, it commonly is considered that the only de jure arti-
ficial legal persons are de jure corporations. 9
Yet, in many instances, institutions which rightfully possess
one or more inherently corporate powers, rights, or capacities, are
treated, for certain purposes and to a more or less limited extent,
as legal persons - entities distinct from their constituent human
beings - although they neither are incorporated nor claim to be
de jure corporations. 9' Thus, unincorporated institutions which, by
virtue of the law of the place of their creation, possess all of the
inherently corporate powers, rights, and capacities, have been treated
elsewhere as corporations. 2 Furthermore, unincorporated institu-
87 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *475.
8 See W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 86, at 263.
89 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *123.
90 See note 81 supra.91 See G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 712 (2d ed. 1960) ; L. GOWER, supra note
81, at 234-36; LLOYD, supra note 81, at 17-18, 48-49, 59, 89, 98-99, 157-58, 221-22.
9 English joint stock association treated as corporation for purposes of Massachusetts
taxing statute, Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566 (1870).
Michigan limited partnership treated as corporation for purposes of California's reg-
ulatory legislation, Hill-Davis Co. v. Atwell, 215 Cal. 444, 10 P.2d 463 (1932).
Massachusetts trusts treated as corporations for purposes of the forum's regulatory
legislation, Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 P. 1045 (1924) ; State ex rel.
Colvin v. Paine, 137 Wash. 566, 243 P. 2 (1926).
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tions have been treated, at the place of their creation, as non-
corporate entities, distinct from their constituent human beings, to
the extent of the inherently corporate powers, rights, and capacities
which they rightfully possess, and those which they properly may
be inferred to possess. Among the unincorporated institutions which
have been so treated are partnerships,9 3 limited partnerships,94 joint
stock companies,95 labor or trade unions, 6 friendly societies,
9 7
Massachusetts or business trusts 8 trustees or trust estates,99 and
other unincorporated institutions.1 0 This treatment, however, gen-
erally is accorded only insofar as third persons are concerned, not
insofar as the entity's constituent human beings are concerned.' 0 '
However, it has been held that a member of a registered trade
union can sue it for breach of contract; 10 2 that a statutory limited
partnership can hire one of its members as an ordinary employee; 0°
and that an ordinary partnership can contract with one of its
members.1
0 4
The entitative treatment of non-corporations constitutes a prac-
tical judicial recognition of the jurisprudential theory that "artificial
personality" is, in fact, a polybasic concept, comprising every entity
to which, in its capacity as such entity, the law attributes rights and
93 Fitzgerald v. Grimmell, 64 Iowa 261 (1884); Lobato v. Paulino, 304 Mich. 668, 8
N.W.2d 873 (1943) ; Rasmussen v. Trico Feed Mills, 148 Neb. 855, 29 N.W.2d 641
(1947); In re Estate of Zents, 148 Neb. 104, 26 N.W.2d 793 (1947); Roop v.
Herron, 15 Neb. 73, 17 N.W. 353 (1883); Finston v. Unemployment Compensation
Commission, 132 N.J.L. 276, 39 A.2d 697 (1944), ajf'd, 134 N.J.L. 232, 46 A.2d
734 (1946); Whitman v. Keith, 18 Ohio St. 134 (1868); Walker v. Wait, 50 Vt.
668 (1878). See also Mason v. Mitchell, 135 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1943); Park v.
Union Mfg. Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 401, 114 P.2d 373 (1941); In re Morrison's Estate,
343 Pa. 157, 22 A.2d 729 (1941).
94 Carle v. Carle Tool & Engineering Co., 36 N.J. Super. 36, 114 A.2d 738 (1955).
9 5 Walker v. Wait, 50 Vt. 668 (1878).
96 Bonsor v. Musician's Union, [1956] A.C. 104; The Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. The Amal-
gamated Society of Ry. Servants, [19013 A.C. 426; National Union of General and
Municipal Workers v. Gillian, [19463 K.B. 81 (C.A. 1945), af'g [1945] 2 All
E.R. 593 (K.B.); Bonsor v. Musician's Union, [19541 2 W.L.R. 687 (C.A.).
97 L. GOWER, supra note 81, at 234-36; LLOYD, supra note 81, at 59.
98 Wagner Oil and Gas Co. v. Marlow, 137 Okla. 116, 278 P. 294 (1929). See also
Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 P. 1045 (1924).
99Tuttle v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 112 Mont. 568, 119 P.2d 884 (1941); CONN.
G.S.A. § 52-202 (1958); MONT. R.C. ANN. § 86-507 (1947); No. DAK. CENT.
CODE § 59-02-10 (1960) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 174 (1961) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 320.939 (Purdon 1950) ; R.I.G.L. § 9-2-9 (as amended 1965) ; S.D. CODE
§ 59.0209 (1939) ; G. BOGERT, supra note 91, § 712.
100 Hamner v. B. K. Bloch & Co., 16 Utah 436, 52 P.770 (1898) ; Morrison v. Standard
Bldg. Socy, [19323 S. Afr. L.R. 229 (App. Div.).
101 Rasmussen v. Trico Feed Mills, 148 Neb. 855, 29 N.W.2d 641 (1947) ; Bonsor v.
Musician's Union, [19543 2 W.L.R. 687 '(C.A.). See also Park v. Union Mfg. Co.,
45 Cal. App. 2d 401, 114 P.2d 373 (1941) ; Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225
P. 1045 (1924); Adams Express Co. v. Schofield, 111 Ky. 832, 64 S.W. 903
(1901) ; Finston v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 132 N.J.L. 276, 39 A.2d
697 (1944) ; In re Morrison's Estate, 343 Pa. 157, 22 A.2d 729 (1941).
50 2 Bonsor v. Musician's Union, [1956] A.C. 104, rev'g [1954] 2 W.L.R. 687 (C.A.).
103 Carle v. Carle Tool & Eng'r Co., 36 N.J. Super. 36, 114 A.2d 738 (1955).
IN Walker v. Wait, 50 Vt. 668 (1878).
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duties.'05 Hence, the sole criterion of legal personality is entitative-
ness- a legal person is that which the law treats as a unit, even
if it be so treated only with respect to a single right or duty. 0"'
Consequently, "the difference between natural and artificial persons
is irrelevant, since all legal personality is artificial and derives its
validity from superior norms. ' '  The quantum of rights and duties
attributed to an entity also is irrelevant, 108 as are its composition,'1 "
its form," 0 and the manner of its creation."'
Yet, only rarely is a non-corporate entity characterized as legal
- as a "legal entity," or "persona juridica," in its own right."12
Generally, such entities, although treated as legal, are character-
ized as illegal because of their "non-corporate" status. To wit,
they commonly are characterized as "quasi-corporations, ""' "quasi-
persons, "11 "near-corporations,""" or "de facto legal persons. "
1'5A. KOCOUREK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF LAW 277-85 (1930);
A. NEKAM, supra note 46; J. SALMOND, supra note 7, §§ 108, 113; Smith, Legal
Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283 (1928). Smith, for example, states: "To be a legal
person is to be the subject of rights and duties. To confer legal rights or to impose
legal duties, therefore, is to confer legal personality." Smith, supra at 283. Similarly,
Kocourek states: "A legal person is a conceptual point of reference created by the
the law for the attribution of rights and ligations." A. KOCOUREK, supra at 283.
1"A. KOCOUREK, supra note 105; A. NEKAM, supra note 46; Smith, supra note 105, at
289. Ct. J. SALMOND, supra note 7, at 337. Nkkam, for example, states: "[T]here
exists a gradation among the legal entities which extends from those which are con-
sidered as such for the purpose of a single right only to those which have a great
number of rights attributed to them." A. NEKAm, supra at 45.
107W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 7, at 233 (expounding Kelsen's pure theory of law).
Accord, J. SALMOND, supra note 7, at 329. "So far as legal theory is concerned, a
person is any being whom the law regards as capable of rights or duties. Any being
that is so capable is a person, whether a human being or not, and no being that is not
so capable is a person, even though he be a man." Id.
108A. KOCOUREK, supra note 105; A. NEKAM, supra note 46; Smith, supra note 105, at
289.
109 Although legal personality commonly is considered to be a possible attribute only of
an individual, or of an entity representing a group of individuals, it also can be
predicated of an individual acting in a dual or multiple capacity, with the result that
the individual possesses a dual or multiple legal personality. See, e.g., BOGERT, supra
note 91, § 712. It even can be predicated of property - such as a fund consecrated
to a specific purpose. LLOYD, supra note 81, at 48-49. See also W. FRIEDMANN, supra
note 7, at 511-29.
110 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 105, at 289.
I" Id.
212Bonsor v. Musician's Union, [1956] A.C. 104, 149-50 (opinion of Lord Keith of
Avonholm); National Union of Gen. and Municipal Workers v. Gillian, [1945] 2
All E.R. 593, 600, 602 (K.B.), aff'd, [1946] K:B. 81, 84-86 (C.A. 1945) (opinion
of Scott, L.J.).
213 Hill-Davis Co. v. Atwell, 215 Cal. 444, 10 P.2d 463 (1930) ; Adams Express Co. v.
Schofield, 111 Ky. 832, 64 S.W.2d 903 (1901); Carle v. Carle Tool & Engineering
Co., 36 N.J. Super. 36, 114 A.2d 738 (1955); LLOYD, supra note 81, at 59, 89,
98-99.
114 In re Morrison's Estate. 343 Pa. 157, 22 A.2d 729 (1941) ; LLOYD, supra note 81, at
157-58.
15 National Union of Gen. and Municipal Workers v. Gillian, [19463 K.B. 81, 87-88
(C.A. 1945) (opinion of Uthwatt, J.); Bonsor v. Musician's Union, [1954] 2
W.L.R. 687, 705 (C.A.) (opinion of Evershed, M.R.).
116 W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 86, at 263.
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b. "Corporateness" - De facto and by Estoppel
Corporations de facto and by estoppel are unincorporated
associations which are treated, for certain purposes, as if they are
de jure corporations. They differ in three respects from the other
non-corporations which are accorded entitative treatment. First,
they assume corporate status. Second, they do not rightfully possess
any inherently corporate powers, rights, or capacities. And, third,
for the purposes for which they are considered as entities, they are
so considered to the same extent as is a de jure corporation.
The de facto corporation is a judicially-created concept. It is
deemed to exist where there is a statute under which incorporation
might have been had; a real, but insufficient, attempt to comply
with the statute; and an exercise of corporate privilege.1 17 In some
instances, it has received legislative sanction." 8 As a general rule,
the existence of a de facto corporation is not dependent upon the
existence of an estoppel.1
9
The considerations of public policy which have engendered
the de facto corporation consist in the protection of third persons,
and the public, who deal, or might deal, with the persons purport-
ing to represent a corporation."" This policy has given rise to the
controversy as to whether an unconstitutional statute can be the
foundation for a de facto corporation.
The basis of the requirement that there must be a statute au-
thorizing creation of a corporation is that the "consent of the state
is absolutely necessary to the creation of any corporation and must
be expressly or impliedly given."'' For purposes of the de facto
doctrine, this consent is deemed to be given by a statute authorizing
117 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, §§ 19, 23; R. STEVENS, supra note 82, § 27.
1
1 8
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-114 (1949) ; 32 ILL. STAT. ANN. § 157.49 (Smith-Hurd
1954); 20 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.08 (1946) ; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 403 (Mc-
Kinney 1963), as amended (1967) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.14(c) (1941) ;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-207 (Purdon 1967); S.C. CODE LAWS tit. 12, § 12-62
(1962); S.D. CODE, § 11.0108 (1939); REV. CODE WASH. ANN. § 23A.12.040
(1961) (add. 1965, eff. July 1, 1967); ENGLISH COMPANIES AcT 19 & 20 Geo. 5,
ch. 23, § 15-(1) (1929) ; R. STEVENS, supra note 82, § 29.
119 Society Perun v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 481, 3 N.E. 357 (1885); H. BALLANTINE,
supra note 82, § 23. Contra, R. STEVENS, supra note 82, § 29.
1
20 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, §§ 19, 22; R. STEVENS, supra note 82, § 29. Ballan-
tine observes,
The recognition of de facto corporate existence when the conditions prece-
dent to incorporation have not been substantially complied with is founded
on public policy and practical convenience. It is essential to the safety of
business transactions with corporations. It would endanger the rights of
corporations and of those dealing with them if questions could be raised
as to irregularities in incorporation, in cases in which such questions have
no just bearing on the transaction involved.
H. BALLANTINE, supra at 70.
121 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, § 19, at 68. See also id. §§ 21, 22; R. STEVENS,
supra note 82, § 29.
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de jure formation of the de facto corporation.' 22 Consequently, it
frequently is held that "there cannot be a corporation de facto
under a statute which is unconstitutional, for an unconstitutional
statute is absolutely void . . . is the same in effect as no law at all,
even if associates organize in good faith in reliance on it."'128  Bal-
lantine has observed:
The fundamental principle is that the state controls the forma-
tion of corporations by statute. If the state has not authorized or
consented to the formation of such a corporation, it is a different
case than where the state has authorized it upon certain conditions
and formalities and the associates have attempted to comply but have
fallen into some irregularity in their proceedings. 124
Cases holding that an unconstitutional statute can constitute
the foundation for a de facto corporation, acknowledge that the
consent of the state is essential to de facto corporate existence.' 2 5
They assert, however, that an unconstitutional statute is as eviden-
tiary of consent as a constitutional one.' 2 1 The real basis of de-
cision, however, is that -[elven though the statute be unconstitu-
tional, the ethical considerations are the same as in those cases where
all the elements are present .... .,127 No case has been found which
attributes the qualities of corporateness to an alleged corporation
whose organization was attempted subsequent to the determination
of unconstitutionality.
Recognition of de facto corporateness generally is phrased in
terms of liability of its purported de jure status to attack. Thus,
a de facto corporation invariably is subject to direct attack only in
proceedings brought by the State to "question the right of an asso-
ciation to be a corporation, and to oust it from the exercise of corpo-
rate powers. ' 12'  The same result obtains where there is legislative
sanction for de facto corporations.' 2 9 The general rule, however,
is that de facto corporations never are subject to collateral attack. 30
This is true irrespective of whether the party seeking to make the
collateral attack is an individual or the State.'.
12 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, § 19. See also id. §§ 21, 22; R. STEVENS, supra note
82, § 29.
12 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, § 21, at 74. See also R. STEVENS, supra note 82,
§ 27.
124 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, at 74.
125 Id. § 21.
126 Id.
127 R. STEVENS, supra note 82, at 144.
128 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, at 67.
129 See note 118 supra.
130 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, §§ 19, 22, 23, 26; R. STEVENS, supra note 82, §§ 26,
27, 29. See material cited note 118 supra.
181 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, §§ 19, 22, 23, 26; R. STEVENS, supra note 82, §§ 26,
27, 29. See material cited note 118 supra.
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Only rarely is a de facto corporation characterized as "legal."
It has been asserted that "[a] de facto corporation is a reality. It
has an actual and substantial legal existence. It is, as the term
implies, a corporation."'3 2 Ballantine has stated that "a corporation
de facto has an actual existence, and is a corporation in contempla-
tion of the law, as against every person except the state, and even
as against the state except in a direct proceeding to question its
corporate existence. ' 1 3 3  Yet both quotations tenaciously describe
such corporations as de facto - illegal, but treated as legal. Stevens,
moreover, observes that "the fact that there are still deviations from
this general rule supports the contention that decisions are reached
by applying a de facto doctrine rather than by recognizing the exist-
ence of a de facto corporation."'3 4
Corporations by estoppel constitute a very limited exception
to the principle that the qualities of "corporateness" shall be at-
tributed only to "corporations." Unlike de facto corporations, which
have been said to have "an actual and substantial legal existence,"3'
corporations by estoppel uniformly are characterized as illegal. 8 '
So, it has been said:
The doctrine of "corporation by estoppel" does not involve
a recognition that an irregular corporation has acquired the corpo-
rate status generally. It only considers the legal consequences of a
particular transaction done in the corporate name by associates as-
suming to be a corporation and dealt with as such by the other party.
The de facto doctrine on the other hand, by excluding collateral at-
tack for various irregularities, on grounds of public policy and more
convenient remedies, in effect recognizes the acquisition of a corpo-
rate status.'3
7
Neither complete absence of a statute under which incorpora-
tion could be had, nor the unconstitutionality of such a statute, if
existent, can prevent the creation of a corporation by estoppel.1
3
1
For, "a corporation by estoppel is not based on statutory authoriza-
tion."'3 9 Rather, it is based upon conduct. The doctrine requires
denial of collateral attack upon the corporate existence only in the
particular litigation, as between the parties thereto. 4 ° As in the
132 Society Perun v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 481, 490, 3 N.E. 357, 360 (1885).
133 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, at 78. Id. §§ 25, 26, 27.
134 R. STEVENS, supra note 82, at 169-70. See also Eaton v. Aspinwall, 19 N.Y. 119
(1859).
135 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, at 85.
136 
Id. §§ 21, 27.
137 Id. at 90-91.
1 38 Id. § 21.
1
3 9 Id. at 72-73.
140 Id. § 27.
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case of de facto corporations, corporations by estoppel have received
legislative sanction.
141
2. Corporate Officers and Directors
Persons who act as corporate officers and directors have a legal
status distinct from their status as individuals.' The essential
characteristics of corporate officers and directors properly are at-
tributable only to those persons who comply, in every respect, with
the conditions requisite to investment with such legal status.'4
Public policy, however, is deemed to require deviations from this
principle."" As in the case of corporations, these exceptions are
denominated illegal, despite the attribution to them of the qualities
possessed by corporate officers and directors. 14" Also, akin to the
corporateness situation, is the division of exceptions into those based
on a de facto doctrine and those arising out of an estoppel. 46
De facto corporate officers and directors are those persons who
are in actual possession of the offices which they claim to hold, and
actually exercise their functions and discharge their duties, under
claim and color of right, with the consent of the corporation, but
who are illegally, or irregularly, elected or appointed. 14 1 "A person
who has not the qualifications for office prescribed by the charter
or statute is not strictly a de facto officer .... .. 148
The de facto doctrine "exists for the protection of the inno-
cent.""' It evolves from the assumption that
"third persons, from the nature of the case, cannot always in-
vestigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office,
even so far as to see that he has color of title to it by virtue of some
appointment or election. If they see him publicly exercising its
authority, if they ascertain that this is generally acquiesced in, they
are entitled to treat him as such officer, and, if they employ him as
such, should not be subjected to the danger of having his acts
collaterally called in question."' ' O
Recognition of the de facto status of persons claiming to be
corporate officers or directors is couched in terms of the circum-
141 R. STEVENS, supra note 82, § 29. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 329 (1953);
FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 608.50 (1955) ; GA. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 22-714 (1966);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-711 '(1964). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.08
(1946).
142 See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, §§ 126, 127; R. STEVENS, supra note 82, § 160.
143 See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, §§ 126, 127; R. STEVENS, supra note 82, § 160.
144 See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, §§ 126, 127; R. STEVENS, supra note 82, § 160.
145 See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, §§ 126, 127; R. STEVENS, supra note 82, § 160.
146 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, § 126.
147 Id. § 126; R. STEVENS, supra note 82, § 160.
148 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, at 399-401.
149 R. STEVENS, supra note 82, at 744.
150In re Ringler & Co., 204 N.Y. 30, 42-43, 97 N.E. 593, 597 (1912). See also H.
BALLANTINE, supra note 82, § 126.
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stances under which the qualities inherent in this status, de jure,
will be ascribed to these persons. Thus, the official acts of de facto
corporate officers and directors, are, insofar as third persons are
concerned, as valid and binding upon these officers and directors,
and the corporation which they claim to represent, as if the de facto
officers and directors were de jure.16' Nor can de facto corporate
officers or directors deny the de jure character of their status, as
against the corporation or its creditors, in order to escape liability
for their official acts.152 Except, however, where the issue involves
the possible liability of the de facto officers to the corporation, the
de facto doctrine does not apply as between the de facto corporate
officers or directors and the corporation or its stockholders." 3 Nor
can rights dependent upon de jure existence as a corporate officer
or director be enforced by one whose status is de facto - e.g., claims
for salary. 5 For the de facto doctrine does not operate to benefit
the de facto entity.
The doctrine of de facto corporate officers and directors has
been described as a legal fiction.' 55 The assertion further has been
made that "the doctrine of de facto directors does not have the
effect of constituting one a director or officer, even in fact. The
doctrine expresses only a principle, intended to effect justice be-
tween the parties in each particular case.' '156
Status by estoppel is more limited in scope than the de facto
doctrine.'57 It attributes the consequences of legality to circum-
stances which do not fulfill the requirements of the de facto doc-
trine. ' It exists only as between parties who have dealt with each
other on the supposition that the person holding himself out to
be a corporate officer or director has that status de jure. And, it
operates only to prevent the would-be corporate officer or director
from denying his status de jure in the particular litigation.
3. Public officers
Persons who act as public officers, like those who act as corpo-
rate officers and directors, possess dual legal status, i.e., their status
qua public officers is distinct from their status qua individuals. In
common with corporations, and with corporate officers and direc-
151 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, § 126; R. STEVENS, supra note 82, § 160.
152 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, § 126.
'53 Id.
154 Id.
155n re Ringler & Co., 204 N.Y. 30, 44, 97 N.E. 593, 598 (1912). "The classification,
as we have seen, is merely a legal fiction which the law invokes for the protection
of third persons and the public." Id.
156 R. STEVENS, supra note 82, at 746.
157 Id. at 744.
5 8 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, § 126.
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tors, public officers, if, and only if, constituted as such by exact
compliance with specified conditions, inherently possess the qualities
characteristic of public officers. Public policy requires, and permits,
but one exception to this rule.1 "9 Like the remainder of public
policy's posterity, it is a species of the genus de facto, and is char-
acterized as illegal, although treated as legal.' Unlike them, how-
ever, it conceals a doctrine of generalized estoppel beneath the mask
of de factoism."'
A de facto public officer "is one who has the reputation or
appearance of being the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact,
under the law, has no right or title to the office he assumes to
hold." '162 Prerequisite to the existence of a de facto public officer
are possession of the office, under color of right or title thereto,
and exercise of the franchise of the office."6 ' There is serious doubt
as to whether existence of a de facto public officer is possible in
the absence of a corresponding office de jure.'14  The orthodox
approach is that "under a constitutional government there can be
no such thing as an office de facto, as distinguished from an officer
de facto. Hence, the general rule that the acts of an officer de facto
are valid, has no application where the office itself does not exist."16
The conflict between this principle, and the public policy on which
15
9 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 12.102, 12.103, 12.106 (3d ed. rev.
1963).
160 ld. § 12.106.
161 Id.
162 1d. at 435-36.
163 Id. § 12.102; Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 909 (1963);
17 N.Y.U.L. REV. 300 (1939-1940).
164 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886) ; State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9
Am.R. 409 (1871) ; Michigan City v. Brossman, 105 Ind. App. 259, 11 N.E.2d 538
(1937); Hildreth's Heirs v. McIntire's Devisee, 24 Ky. (1 J. J. Marsh.) 206, 19
Am.Dec. 61 (1829) ; State v. Poulin, 105 Me. 224, 74 A. 119 (1909) ; Lang v.
Mayor of Bayonne, 74 N.J.L. (45 Vroom) 455, 68 A. 90 (1907) ; Gwynne v. Board
of Educ., 259 N.Y. 191, 181 N.E. 353 (1932) ; E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 159, §
12.104; The De Facto Officer Doctrine, supra note 163; The Validity of Acts of
Officers Occupying Offices Created Under Laws Declared Unconstitutional, 3 U.
NEWARK L. REV. 123 (1938); 29 MINN. L. REV. 36 '(1944-1945); 86 U. PA. L.
REV. 551 (1937-1938).
165 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 159, at 444. See also Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S.
425 (1885) ; Hildreth's Heirs v. Mclntire's Devisee, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh.) 206, 19
Am.Dec. 61 (1829) ; The De Facto Officer Doctrine, supra note 163; The Valid-
ity of Acts of Officers Occupying Offices Created Under Laws Declared Unconstitu-
tional, 3 U. NEWARK L. REV. 123 (1938) ; 29 MINN. L. REv. 36 (1944-1945); 86
U. PA. L. REV. 551 (1937-1938). In Norton v. Shelby County, supra, the leading
exponent of the orthodox view, it was stated at 442:
Their position is, that a legislative act, though unconstitutional, may in terms
create an office, and nothing further than its apparent existence is necessary
to give validity to the acts of its assumed incumbent .... An unconstitutional
act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no pro-
tection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed.
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the doctrine of de facto public officers is based, has resulted in its
denial in many jurisdictions, 16
6 and its modification in others.
16 7
Acknowledgment of the existence of de facto public officers
is motivated by a desire to "preserve the rights of third persons and
the organization of society."'16 8 It is a "matter of recognized neces-
sity to protect the rights of the public and individuals involved in
the official acts of persons exercising the duties of, and occupying
offices under color of law."'6 9 Although it is the interests of the
public, not the interests of the State, which are intended to be pro-
tected, it has been observed that "[w]ariness on the part of the
general public of the authority of public officers would seriously
interfere with the efficient administration of the government and
therefore the public is encouraged to deal in confidence with
them."
170
In the case of public officers, public policy has generated a
doctrine nominally de facto, the intrinsic character of which is
generalized estoppel. That is to say, it is based upon justifiable con-
duct, in reliance on the existence, as true, of a state of facts. Sub-
stantiation of this theory is to be found in the reasoning behind the
validation of acts of public officers, exercising the duties of their
offices pursuant to unconstitutional statutes, when such acts are
performed prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality.' Fur-
thermore, the authority of a de facto public officer is asserted to be
166State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9 Am.R. 409 (1871); Michigan City v. Brossman,
11 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. App. 1937) ; State v. Poulin, 105 Me. 224, 74 A. 119 (1909);
Lang v. Mayor of Bayonne, 74 N.J.L. 455, 68 A. 90 (1907) ; E. MCQUILLIN,
supra note 159, §§ 12.104, 12.106; The De Facto Officer Doctrine, supra note 163;
29 MINN. L. REV. 36 (1944-1945); 3 U. NEWARK L. REv. 123 (1938); 86 U. PA.
L. REv. 551 (1937-1938).
167 The De Facto Officer Doctrine, supra note 163; 86 U. PA. L. REv. 551 (1937-1938).
168 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 159, at 448-53.
1693 U. NEWARK L. REV. 123, 124-25 (1938). See also State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449,
9 Am.R. 409 (1871) ; State v. Poulin, 105 Me. 224, 74 A. 119 (1909) ; 29 MINN. L.
Rav. 36 (1944-1945).
17017 N.Y.U.L. REV. 300 (1939-1940).
171 Thus, it has been stated:
Every law of the legislature, however repugnant to the constitution, has not
only the appearance and semblance of authority, but the force of law. It can-
not be questioned at the bar of private judgment, and if thought unconstitu-
tional resisted, but must be received and obeyed, as to all intents and pur-
poses law, until questioned in and set aside by the courts. This principle is
essential to the very existence of order in society.
State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 472, 9 Am.R. 409 (1871). See also State v. Poulin,
105 Me. 224, 74A. 119 (1909).
Coexistent with this principle is that which denies absolute retroactivity to a
declaration of unconstitutionality:
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an opera-
tive fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration .... [Aln all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 '(1940).
See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) ; material cited supra note 166.
1967
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
founded in reputation.172 More explicitly, it has been observed
that "the reason for validating the acts of a de facto officer does not
exist if the public and third persons are aware of defects in the offi-
cer's title and are not deceived thereby. ' 178 This constitutes a clear-
cut departure from the nature of the de facto doctrines laid down
with respect to corporateness and corporate officers and directors.
For, genuine de factoism is not dependent upon the existence of an
estoppel.
Non-existence of a distinct category of "public officers by
estoppel" results from the fact that the doctrine of de facto public
officers is intrinsically one of estoppel. Persons who assume to act
as public officers thus must be classified either as "de jure public
officers," or "de facto public officers," or as usurpers.17
In common with the de facto doctrines pertaining to "corpo-
rateness" and corporate officers and directors, the doctrine of de
facto public officers is framed in terms of the circumstances under
which the inherent characteristics of the entity, de jure, will be at-
tributed to persons erroneously claiming to be such entities. The
status of one who claims to be a public officer, for example, is
stated to be subject, at all times, to direct attack by the State, or
by private persons acting in the name of the State.175 A de facto
officer, moreover, is not permitted to obtain personal benefit from
his de facto status. 7 ' Hence, his title may be assailed directly when
"he seeks to enforce a perquisite, such as salary, appendant to the
office, or when he raises a privilege, such as judicial immunity, in
a proceeding brought against him personally."'
1 77
As a general rule, however, the status of a person acting as a
public officer is not subject to collateral attack, unless he is a
usurper.'78 The rule applies irrespective of whether the collateral
attack is made by "the public or by private parties seeking to chal-
lenge the officer's action or exercise of jurisdiction, whether that
172 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 159, § 12.102; The De Facto Officer Doctrine, supra
note 163, at 912.
173 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 159, at 451. See also State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 467,
9 Am.R. 409 (1871); The De Facto Officer Doctrine, supra note 163, at 913
(". . . appearance of right to the office requires that the public be unaware of the
defect in the officer's authority.").
174 E. McQUnLIN, supra note 159, §§ 12.102, 12.103; The De Facto Officer Doctrine,
supra note 163.
175 Gwynne v. Board of Education, 259 N.Y. 191, 181 N.E. 353 (1932); Field. The
Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute in the Law of Public Officers: Effect on Official
Status, 13 MINN. L. REV. 439, 441 (1928-1929) ; The De Facto Officer Doctrine,
supra note 163, at 909-10. See also E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 159, §§ 12.102,
12.106.
176 E. MCQuILLIN, supra note 159, § 12.106 at 453; The De Facto Officer Doctrine,
supra note 163.
177 The De Facto Officer Doctrine, supra note 163, at 909-10.
178 Id. at 909-12.
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challenge is in an independent proceeding or in the pending liti-
gation.
' 179
Recently, however, the doctrine of absolute immunity of de
Jacto public officers from collateral attack upon their status has
been eroded.' Thus it has been held that the status of judges
may be attacked collaterally when the alleged defect in authority
affects the jurisdiction of courts."' Such collateral attack may be
made upon trial,18 2 upon direct appeal' 3 or in the course of a col-
lateral attack upon the judgment.1
8 4
De facto public officers uniformly are characterized as ille-
gal.' It has been asserted that "[o]ffice holding de facto is a
fiction of the law designed to serve a useful purpose, but the fiction
does not abolish the law. A de facto officer is not an officer al-
though his acts may have legal effect.'"'86 It also has been stated
that the de facto doctrine expresses not "any quality or character
conferred upon the officer, or attached to him by reason of any
defective election or appointment, but a name or character given
to his acts by the law, for the purpose of validating them."1 7 In
this respect, therefore, the doctrine of de facto public officers con-
forms to that of de facto corporate officers and directors.
4. Legislatures
Legislatures are juristic entities, possessed of legal personalities
separate and distinct from the personalities of their component
legislators, irrespective of whether the latter are considered in their
capacities as public officers, or as individuals.' 8 Strictly speaking,
the intrinsic characteristics of legislatures are attributable only to
those bodies which constitute legislatures de jure.' s9 Yet, as so
frequently happens in connection with legal concepts, attempts at
realization of the idea are abortive. This insufficiency, as usual,
is cured by application of the panacea universally prescribed by
179 Id. at 909-10.
180 Id. at 917-18.
281 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1961); U.S. v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d
Cir. 1962). See also The De Facto Officer Docirine, rupra note 163, at 918.
182Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1961) ; U.S. v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d
Cir. 1962).
183 Cases cited note 182 supra.
18 U.S. v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962).
185 State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9 Am. R. 409 (1871) ; State v. Poulin, 105 Me. 224,
74 A. 119 (1909); Lawrence v. MacDonald, 318 Mass. 520, 62 N.E.2d 850 (Sup.
Jud. Ct. 1945).
188 Lawrence v. MacDonald, 318 Mass. 520, 527, 62 N.E.2d 850, 854 (Sup. Jud. Ct.
1945).
187 State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 467, 9 Am.R. 409, 423 (1871).




public policy - a de facto doctrine. 190 The patient, however, while
appearing to be in perfect health, in fact is not, and must be char-
acterized as illegal, although acknowledged as legal.
The problem of illegally-constituted legislatures, as distinct
from their component legislators, usually is created by a judicial
declaration of invalidity of a State constitutional or statutory plan
of legislative apportionment, as violative of the State or Federal
Constitutions.' 91
Where the issue is one of unconstitutionality vis-a-vis the State
constitution, and is raised subsequent to the election of a State legis-
lature pursuant to the allegedly illegal apportionment plan, a de
facto character is ascribed to the legislature.' 92 This result proceeds
from one of two causes. One alternative is refusal of the judiciary
to take jurisdiction to adjudicate unconstitutionality of the appor-
tionment plan.' 1 3 It is based on the premise that a declaration of
invalidity of the apportionment scheme would result in destruction
of the State legislature.9 4 However, by refusing to allow any at-
tack to be made upon the de jure status of an entity which it ac-
knowledges as illegal, the court, in effect, recognizes the existence
of a de facto entity.' 95 The other alternative is a determination that,
if the legislature has been elected, and has assembled, prior to the
190 Honsey v. Donovan, 236 F. Supp. 8 (D.C. Minn. 1964) ; Jonas v. Hearnes, 236 F.
Supp. 699 (W.D. Mo. 1964) ; League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 232 F.
Supp. 411 (D.C. Neb. 1964) ; Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (S.D.N.D. 1964);
Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907). See also Sherrill v. O'Brien,
186 N.Y. 1, 79 N.E. 7 (1906) ; People ex rel. Baird v. Bd. of Supervisors, 138 N.Y.
95, 33 N.E. 827 (1893) ; Burns v. Flynn, 155 Misc. 742, 281 N.Y.S. 494 (Sup. Ct.
1935), aff'd, 246 App. Div. 799, 281 N.Y.S. 497 (1935), af/'d, 268 N.Y. 601, 198
N.E. 424 (1935). Note that the doctrine of estoppel is as inapplicable to legislatures
as to public officers.
291 See, e.g., WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4 (1965); Travia v. Lomenzo, 382
U.S. 9 (1965), and Screvane v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 11 (1965), affg per curiam,
orders of Fed. Dist. Ct., S.D.N.Y., dated May 24, 1965, and July 13, 1965; Schaefer
v. Thomson, 251 F. Supp. 450 (D. Wyo. 1965), affd, per curiam, sub nom Harrison
v. Schaefer, 383 U.S. 269 (1966) ; Herweg v. Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, 246
F. Supp. 454 (D. Mont. 1965) ; Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.D. 1965);
Petuskey v. Rampton, 243 F. Supp. 365 (D. Utah 1965) ; Honsey v. Donovan, 236
F. Supp. 8 (D.C. Minn. 1964); Jonas v. Hearnes, 236 F. Supp. 699 (W.D. Mo.
1964); League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 232 F. Supp. 411 (D.C. Neb.
1964); Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (S.D.N.D. 1964); Reynolds v. State
Election Bd., 233 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Okla. 1964); Baker v. Carr, 222 F. Supp.
684 '(D. Tenn. 1963); Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Okla. 1963),
a/f'd, per curiam, sub nom. Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964) ; Sims v. Frink,
208 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ala. 1962), a/fd sub nom. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907); Sherrill v. O'Brien,
186 N.Y. 1, 79 N.E. 7 (1906). See also Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292
S.W.2d 40 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
1
9See, e.g., Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907) ; Sherrill v. O'Brien,
186 N.Y. 1, 79 N.E. 7 (1906); Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40
(Sup. Ct. 1956).
193 Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
194 Id.
295 A de facto entity is one which is illegal, but is treated as legal. BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 513 (3d ed. 1933).
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declaration of invalidity of the apportionment plan, it is a legisla-
ture de facto.' Under this approach, the legislators also are de
facto.197 Theoretically, therefore, they could be ousted from office
in a direct proceeding to try their titles thereto- and only in such
direct proceeding."' Since, however, each house of the legislature
is the exclusive judge of the election and qualifications of its mem-
bers, the courts have no jurisdiction to entertain this proceeding
once the legislature has assembled.' 99 Consequently, a State legis-
lature, elected and in office pursuant to an apportionment scheme
thereafter held to violate the State constitution, not only is a de
facto entity, but is one whose de jure status is impregnable to attack,
whether collateral or direct.'00
The status of a legislature, elected pursuant to an apportion-
ment plan held violative of the State constitution prior to the elec-
tion, has not been determined by State courts.2"'
Where the issue is one of unconstitutionality vis-a-vis the
Federal Constitution, three situations possibly may arise. The first
involves a decision by the federal courts that a State legislature,
presently existing as such, was elected pursuant to an apportion-
ment plan violative of the Federal Constitution. Under federal law,
this legislature is considered to be a de facto entity.2" 2 Its existence
is, however, subject to termination at the pleasure of the federal
courts.2"' The second involves the granting of permission, by the
federal courts, for the holding of a State legislative election pur-
196 Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907). See also People Ex rel. Baird
v. Bd. of Supervisors, 138 N.Y. 95, 33 N.E. 827 (1893) ; Burns v. Flynn, 155 Misc.
742, 281 N.Y.S. 494 (Sup. Ct. 1935). In Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. at 212, the
New York Court of Appeals stated: "'[Wlhether the Apportionment Act of 1906 was
constitutional or not, the legislature which might be actually chosen by the electors
of the state under that apportionment would be a de facto legislature, whose acts
would, in all respects be binding."
'7Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907); Sherrill v. O'Brien, 186
N.Y. 1, 79 N.E. 7 (1906).
198 Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907).
199Id.; Sherwood v. State Board of Canvassers, 129 N.Y. 360, 29 N.E. 345 (1891).
200Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907); Kidd v. McCanless, 200
Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
201 In New York, the courts recently have taken jurisdiction to declare a legislative
apportionment scheme void as violative of the state constitution. In re Orans, 45
Misc. 2d 616, 257 N.Y.S. 2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd 15 N.Y. 2d 339, 206 N.E.2d
854 (1965). The judgment of invalidity was rendered prior to the holding of any
ele.tion pursuant to the void plan. An injunction against the holding of any such
election was granted. Glinski v. Lomenzo, 16 N.Y.2d 27, 209 N.E.2d 277 (1965).
The federal courts thereupon intervened to compel the holding of an election pur-
suant to the void plan. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 246 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
4j'd, per curiam, Travia v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 287 (1965). Since no proceedings
were brought to set aside the election after it had been held pursuant to federal court
order, it is unknown what status the New York courts would have attributed to the
legislature elected thereunder, if left to their own devices. As a matter of federal law,
however, this legislature is de facto. See notes 202, 204, 206 infra.




suant to an apportionment scheme which they previously have held
to contravene the Federal Constitution. Legislatures so elected also
are characterized as de facto.2 °4 Theoretically, their existence also
is terminable at the will of the federal courts.2"' Finally, the federal
courts have created de facto legislatures. To wit, they have directed
the holding of State legislative elections pursuant to apportionment
plans promulgated by the federal courts °.20  These legislatures are
de facto because (1) they are illegally constituted, insofar as State
law is concerned; 2 7 and (2) they are treated as legal, their legality
being maintained by the federal courts.
20
Although all of the de facto legislatures described above are
characterized as illegal, 2 ' none of them are vulnerable to collateral
attack, 210 and only two of them are subject to direct attack.2 1 1 The
exceptions, moreover, are liable to extinction only by the federal
courts, at their pleasure.
2 12
5. Divorce
Jurisdiction to create the status of divorce is possessed, in
theory, only by the courts of a jurisdiction in which at least one
of the parties to the marriage is domiciled.21 Yet, the intrinsic
characteristics of divorce frequently are attributed to situations in
which it is found that the condition of domicile was not fulfilled.2 14
These situations are treated as legal, but denominated illegal.21
This variety of legal illegality rests upon the doctrines of res judicata
and estoppel, not de factoism.
216
2°4 Jonas v. Hearnes, 236 F. Supp. 699 (W.D. Mo. 1964) ; League of Nebraska Munici-
palities v. Marsh, 232 F. Supp. 411 (D. Neb. 1964); Paulson v. Meier, 231 F.
Supp. 183 (S.D.N.D. 1964).
Cases cited note 204 supra.
208 See, e.g., Screvane v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 11 '(1965); Travia v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 9
(1965) ; WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4 (1965) ; Herweg v. The Thirty-Ninth
Legislative Assembly, 246 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mont. 1965); Paulson v. Meier, 246
F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.D. 1965); Petuskey v. Rampton, 243 F. Supp. 365 (D. Utah
1965) ; Schaefer v. Thomson, 251 F. Supp. 450 (D. Wyo. 1965); Reynolds v. State
Election Board, 233 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Okla. 1964); Baker v. Carr, 222 F. Supp.
684 (D. Tenn. 1963); Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Okla. 1963);
Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ala. 1962), aff'd sub nom. Reynolds v. Sims.
377 U.S. 533'(1964).
207 State law generally requires that legislative apportionment schemes be created by act
of the state legislature, or a commission set up for this purpose. It does not authorize
their creation by the federal judiciary.
208 Cases cited at note 206 supra.
209 Cases cited at note 191 supra.
210 Cases cited at note 191 supra.
211 Cases cited notes 202, 204 supra.
212 Cases cited notes 202, 204 supra.
213 G. STUMBERG, supra note 79, at 296.





Res judicata operates to preclude all collateral attacks, by
whomsoever made, upon a divorce decree obtained in a proceeding
in which both parties to the marriage appeared.21 This result
obtains irrespective of whether the fact of domicile was litigated
in the divorce proceeding.21
Ex parte divorces are not entitled to the benefits of res judi-
cata.219 Their effectiveness depends upon the selective operation
of the doctrine of estoppel.22 ° Estoppel bars both the party pro-
curing the divorce, and a spouse who remarries in apparent reliance
upon it, from collaterally contesting its validity. 221' Third parties,
however, such as the State and children of the first marriage, may
assert the invalidity of the divorce in a collateral proceeding. 2 2
Where estoppel is the cause of a situation being characterized
as a divorce, it has been observed that the divorce still must be
considered as invalid.2 23  And, where the status of divorce is pro-
duced by application of res judicata, discussion is couched in terms
of vulnerability to attack, not validity.
2 2 4
B. Legal Illegality - Genesis and Regenesis
Examination of the judicial approach to corporations, corporate
officers and directors, public officers, legislatures, and divorce,
manifests a pattern of consistent inconsistency. In the case of each
of these categories, the inherent attributes of the juristic entity, or
legal status - its consequences of legality - are imputed to a
variety of factual situations. Yet only one of these situations is
characterized as legal - de jure. Uniformly, it is the one whose
name is borne by the legal concept of which it is a constituent class.
The remainder, denominated variously as "quasi, ' 225 "near,"
226
de facto,22 7 "by estoppel," 22 1 or the result of res judicata, 221 com-
monly are characterized as illegal.
217Id. at 258-59. Thus, the decree is impregnable to attack, not only by the parties
thereto, but by their children, subsequent spouses, and the state.
218 1d. at 258-59.
219 Id., § 127.





24 Id. at 258.
225 Legal persons. See pt. III A la supra.
22s Id.
"7 Corporateness, corporate officers and directors, public officers, and legislatures. See
pts. III A ib-4 supra.
a Corporateness, corporate officers and directors, and divorce. See pts. III A ib, 2, and
5 supra.
229 Divorce. See pt. III A 5 supra.
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Classification of facts as legal, simultaneously legal and illegal,
or as illegal, constitutes a paradox. It originates from two sequen-
tial misconceptions: one semantic, the other analytic.
On the semantic side of the coin, the fallacious belief that
legality and illegality can have objective existence, has perpetuated
the procrustean identification of legal concepts with the component
classes whose names they bear. Thus, artificial personality and
corporateness are equated with corporation; corporate and public
officeholding with corporate officers and directors, and public offi-
cers; legislativeness with legislatures; and termination of marital
status with divorce. This false identification of the genus with one
of its species has necessitated the assumption that the inherent
qualities of a concept can be attributed to a factual situation which
does not correspond to the concept as a schematism. This fallacy,
in turn, results in postulation of the coincident existence of the
antipodal concepts "legality" and "illegality."
Since, however, the attributes of a legal concept are correlative
to the conditions of its realization, it is impossible to recognize a
concurrence of "legality" and "illegality." For, all circumstances to
which are attributed the inherent qualities of a legal concept
a priori comply with the conditions for its realization, and are
"legal." Hence, those factual situations, described as "quasi" or
"near," or as possessing the consequences of legality de facto, by
estoppel, or as the result of res judicata, must be characterized as
"legal."
Acceptance of this radical inversion of a keystone of juristic
thought, requires extirpation of the jural chimeras known as "legal
fictions" - recognition that distinctions between reality and fiction
are irrelevant, insofar as the Law is concerned. For, the fallacious
assumption, that factual situations possessed of the consequences
of legality can be described as illegal, has been perpetuated by uni-
versal acceptance of the erroneous theory that there are such crea-
tures as legal fictions. To wit, that which the law recognizes as
real can be characterized as fiction. For example, apart from the
imputation of illegality implicit in the terms quasi, near, de facto,
estoppel, res judicata, voidable, constructive, and implied, it has
been stated that the de facto doctrine does not recognize the exist-
ence, as legal entities, of de facto corporations, 230 de facto corpo-
rate officers and directors,2 31 or de facto public officers.2 32 Non-
230 R. STEVENS, supra note 82, § 29. See also Eaton v. Aspinwall, 19 N.Y. 119 (1859).
231 R. STEVENS, supra note 82, § 160.
232 State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9 Am. R. 409 (1871); City of Lawrence v. MacDon-
aid, 318 Mass. 520, 62 N.E.2d 850 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; State v. Poulin, 105 Me. 224,
74 A. 119 (1909).
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corporate legal persons, 38 de facto corporate officers and direc-
tors,2 34 and de facto public officers,235 have been described, more-
over, as legal fictions. The doctrine of estoppel, likewise, is said
not to involve recognition of the legal existence of the status, created
thereby, of corporations,236 or of divorce.23 7
The only effective method of eradicating legal fictions from
juristic thought is "nominicide. '23  That is to say, all words and
phrases connotative of "legal illegality" must be expunged from
legal terminology. Included in this "little list of society offenders
who . . . never would be missed' '239 are "quasi," "near," "de facto,"
"legal by estoppel," "legal by reason of res judicata," "voidable,"
"constructive," and "implied." And, like Abou Ben Adhem's name, 240
the term "legal fiction" leads all the rest.
The necessity for this measure is manifested by examination
of the scanty expressions of belief in the actual existence of so-called
de facto corporations.24" ' These expressions are self-defeating, in
that they describe an entity as being, at one and the same time, both
de f,cto and real. Likewise, some statutes which provide legislative
authorization for the impregnability to attack of the legal existence
of so-called de facto corporations, in all proceedings except direct
attacks by the State, refer to these corporations as de facto.
242
The resultant terminological deficiency can be alleviated by
use of the phrase "juridical construction" as the appropriate denomi-
nation for all facts, or aggregates of facts, recognized in Law.243
A fact, or aggregate of facts, to which is attributed the consequences
of legality properly would be described as a juridical construction
of the relevant concept. For example, all factual situations to which
are imputed the attributes of corporateness, whether presently de-
nominated de jure, de facto, or by estoppel, would be called juridical
constructions of corporateness.
2
3 In re Morrison's Estate, 343 Pa. 157, 22 A.2d 729 (1941).
24In re Ringler & Co., 204 N.Y. 30, 97 N.E. 593 (1912).
235 Citv of Lawrence v. MacDonald, 318 Mass. 520, 62 N.E.2d 850 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
236 H. BALLANTINE, supra note 82, § 127.
27 H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, supra note 214, § 27.
238 A semantic fabrication, signifying the destruction of names.
239 GILBERT & SULLIVAN, The Mikado, in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF GILBERT AND SUL-
LIVAN 345, 352 (1938).
2 0 L. HUNT, Abou Ben Adhem, in THE BOOK OF CLASSIC ENGLISH POETRY 600-1830,
at 1510 (E. Markham ed. 1926).
24 See notes 132-33 supra.
242 S.D. CODE § 11.0108 (1939). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.08 (1947)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.14(c) (1941) (refers to psuedo-corporation). The
Commissioner's Note to § 9 of the Model Business Corporation Act quotes, moreover,
from Society Perun v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 481, 490, 3 N.E. 357 (1885), referring
to de lacto corporations as real. MODFL Bus. CORP. ACT 71. § 9 (1953) (withdrawn
1957).
M See pt. I supra.
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Consequently, the path to comprehension of the true character
of the analysis to be made is clear. The classification of facts as
simultaneously legal and illegal, involves a purely qualitative analy-
sis of facts according to their juristic nature. This analysis ignores
the gradational aspect of attributions of consequences of legality.
Proper analysis is bivalent in nature. Qualitatively, it categorizes
factual situations as legal or illegal. In other words, it determines
whether the consequences of legality are attributable to a particular
factual situation. Quantitatively, it measures the extent to which
the consequences of legality are attributable to the "juridical con-
structions" of a concept. Since attribution of the consequences of
legality recognizes both the existence and the degree of the quality
of legality - i.e., is constitutive of them - legal illegality is re-
generated as a doctrine of relative recognition.
IV. RELATIVE RECOGNITION - OLD WINE IN A NEW BOTTLE
Acceptance of a doctrine of relative recognition operates to
substitute one system of legal terminology for another. The present
system considers legality as independent of the attribution of its
consequences to factual situations. In other words, definitions and
descriptions of rights, duties, personality, status, and other expres-
sions of legality, do not correspond to the entirety of circumstances
which require or permit attribution of the consequences of legality.
Legality, however, is dependent upon, and correlative to, the totality
of these circumstances. This system, therefore, is both inadequate
and misleading. John Chipman Gray, for example, has observed,
apparently in all seriousness:
What we want for the conduct of life is to know what are the
acts and forbearances which the State protects, and what are the acts
and forbearances which it compels; in other words, what are legal
rights and duties? At whose instance these acts and forbearances
are protected and enforced, though important, is yet of secondary
importance.244 [Italics supplied.]
The function of the proposed system of legal terminology is
to make manifest the correlation between legality and the circum-
stances which require or permit attribution of its consequences.
A. Relative Recognition - Formulation
Simply to state that all factual situations which require or
permit attribution of the consequences of legality must be charac-
terized as legal, because such attribution recognizes, or is constitu-
tive of, the quality of legality, is inadequate as an analysis of legality.
For, "legality" is a compound expression. It encompasses both the
24 J. GRAy, supra note 1, at 83.
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inherent qualities of the idea whose meaning is represented by a
legal concept, and the attribution of these qualities to a factual
situation. Although these qualities are absolute,245 attribution of
these qualities is relative. The variable which constitutes this rela-
tivity, consists in the class of persons who are capable of forbidding
this attribution.246 Adequate analysis must take account of both
aspects of "legality." It must be formulated as a doctrine of relative
recognition, in terms of the variable constitutive of the relativity.
That is to say, all circumstances which require or permit the attribu-
tion of the consequences of legality not only must be characterized
as "legal," but also must be classified with reference to the class of
persons who are capable of barring recognition of legality.
M Attribution of the consequences of legality of a legal concept necessarily involves
attribution of all of the inherent qualities of the idea whose meaning is represented
by the concept. WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 552 (Concept) (2d. ed. unabr.
1937).
2 Although the relative aspect of legality heretofore has been recognized in connection
with artificial personality, its true nature has been obscured by the misconception
that the variable, constitutive of this relativity, consists in the quantum of the quali-
ies of corporateness which are attributable to a factual situation. Friedmann, for
example, accurately states: "It would, perhaps, be truer to say that legal personality
is not absolute, that it can exist to a smaller or greater degree ....' Yet, he goes on
to observe, quoting Gower: "The relativity of corporate personality, both in quantity
and quality, thus is demonstrated by the modern treatment of incorporated associa-
tions as well as the status of unincorporated associations. 'Between the two extremes
of an unincorporated club or society and the corporation there are many hybrids which,
though formally unincorporated, possess a greater or lesser number of the attributes
of a corporation.' " W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 7, at 525-26. Similarly N~kam
observes: "[T)here exists a gradation among the legal entities which extends from
those which are considered as such for the purpose of a single right only to those
which have a great number of rights attributed to them." A. NEKAM, supra note 46,
at 45. This approach derives from the identification of artificial personality with
corporateness. See Carle v. Carle Tool & Eng'r Co., 36 N.J. Super. 36, 114 A.2d 738
(1955); National Union of Gen. & Municipal Workers v. Gillian, [1946] K.B. 81
(C.A. 1945). It involves a confusion between differences in kind and differences
in degree. Artificial personality, however, is not identical with corporateness. Inher-
ent in it is but one quality, i.e., entitativeness - any institution which possesses one
or more inherently entitative powers, rights, or capacities, is an artificial person.
A. KOCOUREK, supra note 105, at 277-85; A. NEKAM, supra, J. SALMOND, supra
note 7, §§ 108, 113; Smith, supra note 105, at 283. The fact that an artificial person
does not possess all of the inherently corporate powers, rights, and capacities does not
constitute it a lesser type of artificial person, but simply a different type of artificial
person. That is to say, although legal entities are classified according to the number
of inherently entitative powers, rights, and capacities which they possess, the differ-
ences between the resultant classes are in kind, not in degree. Corporations, for
example, are considered to be de jure legal persons although they lack the capacity to
marry possessed by the competent natural person. Infants and incompetents, moreover,
are considered to be de jure legal persons although they lack many powers, rights
and capacities possessed by competent adult natural persons. Consequently, the vari-
able constitutive of the relativity of artificial personality cannot be said to consist in
the quantum of inherently corporate powers, rights and capacities attributable to a
factual situation. Rather, as in the case of other legal concepts, it consists in the
class of persons capable of forbidding the attribution, to a particular factual situation,
of the quality of entitativeness.
It follows that proper analysis of artificial personality is dual: First, according
to differences in kind, arising from the number of inherently entitative powers, rights,
and capacities possessed. These differences are absolute. This classification demarcates
the species of the generic legal concept artificial personality, one of which is cor-
porateness. Each of these species is itself a legal concept, possessed of inherent quali-
ties peculiar to it. Second, according to differences in degree, arising from the class
of persons capable, with respect to each kind of artificial personality, of barring the
attribution of entitativeness. These differences are relative.
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The proposed doctrine of relative recognition, therefore, should
be formulated as a hierarchy of juridical constructions of legal con-
cepts.247 For example, the doctrine first would be stated in general
terms: (1) attribution to a factual situation of the consequences of
legality constitutes recognition that the factual situation possesses
the quality of legality - all the qualities inherent in the idea repre-
sented by the concept being applied; (2) all factual situations which
thus are recognized to possess the quality of legality, are denomi-
nated juridical constructions of the legal concept whose conse-
quences of legality are attributed to them; (3) juridical construc-
tions of a legal concept must be classified with reference to the
extent to which the consequences of legality are attributable to them
in terms of the class of persons who are capable of barring their
recognition.
Classification of the juridical constructions of legal concepts
produces a four-tiered arrangement. The highest category is that
of absolute impregnability. To wit, recognition of the quality of
legality can be precluded by no one. The most prominent members
of this grouping are the tautonyms of legal concepts, presently de-
scribed as de jure. Examples of these include, inter alia, de jure
corporations; de jure corporate officers and directors; de jure public
officers; de Jure legislatures; valid divorce and those varieties of
so-called de facto legislatures whose existence de jure can be con-
troverted by no one.2 48 Similarly included are those so-called de
facto legal persons, which are treated as entities, to the extent of
the inherently corporate powers, rights, and capacities, which they
rightfully possess, not only as to third persons, but also insofar as
their constituent human beings are concerned. 249 Additional com-
ponents of this class are those factual situations to which certain
varieties of res judicata are applicable,25 as well as those which are
conclusively presumed to exist.25 ' All members of this category are
denominated juridical constructions of the first degree.
The second category is one of particular vulnerability. It com-
prises the circumstances which permit denial of the attribution of
the consequences of legality of a legal concept to its de jure tauto-
nyms. The most obvious illustrations of this variation are the circum-
stances which require or permit lifting the veil of corporate person-
247 See pt. III B supra.
248 See pt. III A 4 supra.
249 See, e.g., Carle v. Carle Tool & Eng'r Co., 36 N.J. Super. 36, 114 A.2d 738 (1955)
(statutory limited partnership) ; Walker v. Wait, 50 Vt. 668 (1878) '(ordinary part-
nership) ; Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1956 H.L.] A.C. 104 (trade unions).
250 See, e.g., pt. III A 5 supra.
251 E.g., constructive possession, constructive delivery, constructive notice.
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ality.2" 2 A further example is the so-called de facto merger doctrine. " '
Its function is to invalidate otherwise valid sales of corporate assets,
on the ground that they are really mergers which have failed to
comply with statutory requirements therefor.254 Also included in
this category are those factual situations presently characterized as
voidable. Members of this category may be described as juridical
constructions of the second degree.
The third category is one of modified impregnability. That is
to say, recognition of enjoyment of the quality of legality, by factual
situations which do not fulfill, strictly, the conditions for de jure
legality, can be precluded only by an exceedingly restricted class of
persons, and only under limited conditions. The most conspicuous
members of this class are the so-called de facto situations. Some ex-
amples of these are de facto corporations; de facto corporate officers
and directors; and de facto public officers. Also included in this
grouping are those de facto legislatures whose existence is subiect to
termination at the pleasure of the federal courts.2"' Additional com-
ponents of this class are those so-called de facto legal persons which
are treated as entities, to the extent of the inherently corporate powers,
rights and capacities, which they rightfully possess, but only insofar
as third persons are concerned. 2- Their entitativeness can be pre-
cluded by their constituent human beings, although only with re-
spect to dealings between the entity and its components. 5 7 Possible
further candidates for inclusion in this class are circumstances in
which res judicata is deemed inapplicable, although, conceivably, it
might have been applicable. For example, where the person sought
to be bound by the doctrine was not a party to the prior action,
although he should have been. The phrase, juridical constructions
of the third degree, denotes members of this category.
The lowest tier of this hierarchy is that of particular impregna-
bility. To wit, recognition of enjoyment of the quality of legality,
by factual situations which do not fulfill, strictly, the conditions for
de jure legality, can be precluded by all but an exceedingly limited
class of persons, under all but exceedingly limited conditions. En-
compassed in this category are all factual situations to which the
doctrine of estoppel is applicable. Representative of the members
5
2 See W. FILEDMANN, supra note 7, at 473, 515-28.





255 See pt. III A 4 supra.
25
6 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Trico Feed Mills, 148 Neb. 855, 29 N.W.2d 641 (1947)
(ordinary partnership) ; Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1954] 2 W.L.R. 687 (C.A.)
(trade unions). The same is true of trusts, when treated as entities insofar as third
persons are concerned.
27 Note 256 supra.
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of this class are corporations by estoppel; corporate officers and
directors by estoppel; and divorce by estoppel. Also included in
this class are those factual situations whose existence is implied,
e.g., implied contracts, and implied or constructive trusts. Members
of this class are denominated juridical constructions of the fourth
degree.
Formulation of legal consequences in terms of recognition is
not novel. The legal effects of judgments, for example, frequently
are expressed in this fashion.258 Recognition also is an operative
principle of international law.259 Yet, although acceptance of a
doctrine of relative recognition would cause no substantial change
in juristic thinking with respect to recognition of judgments, it
possibly might avail to sever the Gordian Knot of "recognition" in
international law.
B. Recognition as an Instrument of juristic Analysis in
International Law
"State" and "government," like "corporation," "corporate offi-
cer or director," "public officer," "legislature," and "divorce," are
tautotypical legal concepts. It follows, therefore, that all factual
situations, which require or permit attribution of the consequences
of legality of these concepts, must be characterized as legal- as
juridical constructions of "States" or "governments." For, attribu-
tion of these consequences recognizes, or is constitutive of, the
quality of legality. Yet, in international law, as in municipal law,
legal illegality endures. In this sphere, it occurs as a function of
international recognition. Its existence causes application of the
doctrine of relative recognition to be as logically unavoidable in the
sphere of international law, as it is in the sphere of municipal law.
This doctrine, however, is insufficient, in and of itself, to resolve
the problem of legal illegality in international law. For, in this
area, legal illegality has enabled the treatment, as legal, of entities
which, as a matter of public policy, are incapable of being charac-
terized as legal. This treatment has been justified by the ancient
error: that attribution of the consequences of legality is not consti-
tutive of the quality of legality. Thus, prerequisite to the necessary
application, in international law, of the doctrine of relative recog-
nition, is a redetermination of the circumstances to which the con-
sequences of legality of statehood and government can be attributed.
1. Legal Illegality in International Law
Classification of States and governments, as commonly ex-
pressed, is identical with that of public officers: de jure; de facto;
258 See, e.g., G. STUMBERG, supra note 79, at 111-33.
259 See pt. IV B infra.
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and usurping - those whose continued existence is in doubt.2 6
Yet, whereas these terms, in municipal law, are rigid in their mean-
ings,261 they have, in international law, such variegated meanings
as to be useless as analytic tools.
26 2
Thus, Austin, although asserting that "every government prop-
erly so called is a government de facto, ' 2 3 distinguishes between
three kinds of governments:
First, governments which are governments de jure and also
de facto; secondly, governments which are governments de jure but
not de facto; thirdly, governments which are governments de facto
but not de jure.2 6
4
According to Borchard, however, as a matter of practice, the
term de jure is applied to states and governments "one likes and
recognizes," 26 5 often irrespective of whether they presently are
established and effective; the term de facto being applied to states
and governments "one dislikes and declines to recognize," 266 also
irrespective of whether they presently are established and effective.
Borchard would prefer to apply the term de facto to usurpers:
The suggestion that recognized governments are governments
de jure, and unrecognized governments only de facto ... is ...
unlegal . . The term de facto has a more appropriate applica-
tion with reference to revolutionists in the field, who administer
public affairs in some limited area, before they establish themselves
as a government or found a state.
26 7
The term de facto, moreover, is applied not only to established
states and governments, when unrecognized, and to those whose
260 1 J. AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 336; 2 J. BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUD-
ENCE 503-555 (1901); J. HERVEY, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 12-16 (1928); Borchard, The Unrecognized Government in Ameri-
can Courts, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 261 (1932) For classification of public officers, see
pt. III A 3 supra.
26 When used with reference to corporations, corporate officers and directors, or public
officers, etc.
262 In fact, they could be said to qualify for additional compensation under Humpty-
Dumpty's principle: "When I make a word do a lot of work like that ... I always
pay it extra." LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, ALICE IN WONDER-
LAND 247 (Modern Library ed.). See, e.g., 1 J. AUSTIN, supra note 8; J. HERVEY,
supra note 260; H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 275-77 (1956) ;
Borchard, supra note 260; Lauterpacht, Recognition of Governments: 1, 45 COLUM.
L. REV. 815 (1945).
263 1 J. AUSTIN, supra note 260.
264 Id. Austin describes these classes as follows: "A government de lure and also de facto
is a government deemed lawful ... which is present or established.... A government
de jure but not de facto, is a government deemed lawful ... which, nevertheless, has
been supplanted or displaced.... A government de facto but not de jure, is a govern-
ment deemed unlawful ... which, nevertheless, is present or established .... A gov-
ernment supplanted or displaced, and not deemed lawful, is neither a government de
acto nor a government de jure. Any government deemed lawful, be it established or
e it not, is a government de jure .... In strictness, a so called government de jure
but not de facto, is not a government. It merely is that which was a government
once, and which (according to the speaker) ought to be a government still."
26 Borchard, supra note 260, at 262.
267 Id. at 263.
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continued existence is in doubt, as in the case of revolution or civil
war, but to those which are recognized conditionally."' Furthermore,
classification of States and governments as de jure, de facto, or
usurping, does not determine, per se, whether, or to what extent,
the consequences of legality shall be attributed to them.2"' For, in
international law, the sine qua non of juristic personality is recog-
nition, as defined by international law.
270
States and governments, therefore, properly are classified, un-
der international law, either as recognized, or as unrecognized. As
in municipal law, however, the consequences of legality of state-
hood and government are attributed not only to recognized, or
de jure, entities, but also to unrecognized, or illegal, entities.
In contrast to the situation existing in municipal law, how-
ever, application of the doctrine of relative recognition, to all non-
recognition situations now treated as legal, does not eliminate legal
illegality. For, the treatment, as legal, of non-recognition situations,
can create a state of affairs in which the judiciary has recognized,
or constituted, the existence of a State or government whose non-
existence is required by executive policy. Where this state of affairs
exists, public policy, in the form of national self-interest, prohibits
the characterization as legal of the non-recognition situations judi-
cially treated as legal. Hence, a reclassification of the factual situa-
tions to which the consequences of legality of statehood or govern-
ment can be attributed, is prerequisite to the inescapable application
of the doctrine of relative recognition in the sphere of international
law. This redetermination involves isolation of those non-recogni-
tion situations to which public policy denies the characterization of
legality.
Once these situations are eliminated from the group of non-
recognition situations which are treated as legal, the doctrine of
relative recognition can be applied in conformity with the exigencies
of public policy.
W Institut DeDroit International: Resolutions Concerning the Recognition of Neu,
States and New Governments, 30 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 185 (1936).
269See, e.g., The Arantzazu Mendi, [19391 P. 37 (C.A.), affd, [1939] A.C. 256, 33
AM. J. INT'L L. 583 '(1939) ; Banco de Bilbao v. Sancha, [1938] 2 K.B. 176 (C.A.) ;
Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt and Liguori, [1937] 1 Ch. 513; J. HER-
VEY, supra note 260, at 3-19; H. KEI.SEN, supra note 262, at 267-92; Borchard, supra
note 260.
270 J. HERVEY, supra note 260, at 7; H. KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE,
supra note 44, at 221-29; H. KELSEN, supra note 262, at 267-88; D. O'CoNNELL,
I INT'L LAW 94, 139-40 (1965); Borchard, supra note 260; Lauterpacht, Recogni-
tion of Governments: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 815 (1945) ; Lauterpacht, Recognition
of States in International Law, 53 YALE L.J. 385 (1944). See also pt. IV B 3 infra.
Although exponents of the declaratory theory of recognition (pt. IV B 2, infra)
assert that the sine qua non of legal personality is compliance with the requirements,
other than recognition, laid down by international law for the existence of States and
governments, this assertion is contradicted by judicial practice (pts. IV B 3, 4, infra).
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2. International Recognition- Sine qua non of
International Juristic Personality
International recognition, of a State or government, is a declara-
tion by one State that, according to international law, another State
fulfills the conditions of statehood, or that its government is cap-
able of binding the State which it claims to represent.27 ' It is a
condition precedent to the proper attribution of the consequences
of legality of statehood or government.2 72  That is to say, recog-
nition is the determination of a fact which must be made by the
competent authority, in the first phase of the legal process, of which
the attribution of consequences of legality is the last phase.
273
Attribution of the consequences of legality of statehood or
government to non-recognized entities, however, is not, per se, in-
consistent with the principle that international recognition is an
indispensable prerequisite to the legal existence of States and gov-
ernments. For, in international law, as elsewhere, there are degrees
of legality, i.e., degrees of international recognition. The majority
of the non-recognition situations, for example, involve situations
which may be termed "representative recognition." That is to say,
the non-recognized entity was deemed, in law, to be acting as the
representative of a recognized entity. Where, however, no similar
substitute for international recognition can be adduced, public policy
271 H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE, supra note 44, at 221-24; H.
KELSEN, supra note 262, at 267-75, 280-90; Kelsen, Recognition in International
Law: Theoretical Observations, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 605 (1941); Kunz, Critical
Remarks on Lauterpacht's 'Recognition in International Law', 44 AM. J. INT'L L.
713 (1950); Lauterpacht, Recognition of Governments: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 815
(1945); Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law, 53 YALE L.J. 385
(1944); Meeker, Recognition and the Restatement, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 83 (1966).
Although international recognition can be granted either de jure or de facto, the
legal effects, if not the political ones, of both forms of recognition are identical.
Arantzazu Mendi, [1939] A.C. 256, 265, aff'g [1939] P. 37 (C.A.) ; Luther v. James
Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.) ; Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co.,
36 Ch. D. 489 (1887); J. HERVEY, supra note 260, at 12-16; H. KELSEN,
supra note 262, at 275-77; Briggs, De Facto and De lure Recognition: The
Arantzazu Mendi, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 689 (1939) ; Kallis, The Legal Effects
of Nonrecognition of Russia, 20 VA. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1933) ; Kelsen, Recog-
nition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, supra. The only excep-
tion to this rule occurs when a dispute arises between two entities, one recognized
de jure as the government of a state, and the other recognized de facto as the govern-
ment of the same state. Effective and established, the de facto entity will prevail
where the acts in question were to be effective within its territorial jurisdiction or
where the property or claim in question is that of the state qua state. Banco de Bilbao
v. Sancha, [1938] 2 K.B. 176 (C.A.) ; Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt
& Liguori, [1937] 1 Ch. 513; Haile Selassie v. Cable & Wireless, Ltd. (No. 2),
[1939] 1 Ch. 182 (C.A.).
2J. HERVEY, supra note 260, at 3-19; D. O'CONNELL, supra note 270, at 94, 138;
Fraenkel, The Juristic Status of Foreign States, Their Property and Their Acts, 25
COLUM. L. REV. 544 (1925); Kelsen, supra note 271. See also Rose v. Himely, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 240 (1808); Republic of China v. Merchants' Fire Assur. Corp. of
N.Y., 30 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1929) ; The Hornet, 12 F. Gas. 529 '(No. 7621) (D.C.
N.C. 1870); Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim. *213 (1828) ; The Annette, The Dora,
[19191 P. 105.




absolutely forbids the characterization of non-recognition situations
as legal. Correlatively, these situations cannot be treated as legal.
Attribution of the consequences of legality of statehood or
government, where representative recognition is inapplicable, neces-
sarily involves a rejection, total or partial, of the necessity of inter-
national recognition. This rejection has been engendered by four
misconceptions: First, as to the conditions requisite for the legal
existence of a State or government. Second, as to the authority
competent to determine whether these conditions have been met.
Third, as to the effects of attribution of the consequences of legality
of statehood or government. Fourth, as to the circumstances which
compensate for the lack of international recognition.
Clarifying these misconceptions will prevent the treatment, as
legal, of those non-recognition situations to which public policy
denies the characterization of legal, by re-establishing international
recognition as the sine qua non of the juristic personality of States
and governments.
The prevalent confusion, as to the conditions prerequisite to
the legal existence of States and governments, manifests itself
as a controversy over the nature and function of international
recognition. It has resulted in partially erroneous, and totally anti-
thetical, descriptions of international recognition as constitutive
74
and declaratory. 5
The constitutive theory considers international recognition of
statehood, or government, by the competent authority, to be the sole
factor constitutive of the legal existence of the recognized entity,
vis-a-vis the recognizing entity.' 6 At this point, exponents of the
constitutive theory come to a parting of the ways. Kelsen denies any
right to recognition or any duty to recognize.2 7 7  Lauterpacht, on
the other hand, affirms a right in new States and governments to
recognition, and a corresponding duty in established States to grant
it, if the requirements of international law are fulfilled.2 78 The
214 H. KELsEN, Supra note 262, at 269-75; Kelsen, supra note 271; Lauterpacht, Recog.
nition of Governments: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 815 (1945) ; Lauterpacht, Recognition
of States in International Law, 53 YALE L.J. 385 (1944). See also D. O'CONNELL,
supra note 270, at 139-40; Borchard, Recognition and Non-Recognition, 36 AM. J.
INT'L L. 108 (1942) ; Brown, The Effects of Recognition, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 106
(1942) ; Meeker, supra note 271.
275 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 270, 139-40; Borchard, supra note 274; Brown, The
Effects of Recognition, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 106 (1942); Kunz, supra note 271;
Meeker, supra note 271.
278See authorities cited note 274 supra.
277 H. KELSEN, supra note 262, at 269-75; Borchard, supra note 274; KELSEN, supra
note 271.
2 78 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 270, at 139-40; Lauterpacht, Recognition of Govern-
ments: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 815 (1945); Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in
International Law, 53 YALE L.J. 385 (1944).
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constitutive theory affirms that international recognition is a pre-
requisite to attribution of the consequences of legality of state-
hood and government. 279 The error of this theory lies, not in itself,
but in its effects. It appears to require the erroneous conclusion that
these consequences of legality cannot be attributed to any acts of un-
recognized States or governments.2 80
The declaratory theory asserts that international recognition
merely proclaims a pre-existing fact; that unrecognized States and
governments can have rights and duties in international law.28 1 It
denies, moreover, the existence of any right to, or duty of, inter-
national recognition. 82  Furthermore, it totally rejects international
recognition as a condition precedent to attribution of the conse-
quences of legality of statehood or government.283
This rejection, however, and its parent theory, arise from the
ancient misconception that the Law is founded upon objective
realities. Thus, it is asserted that the consequences of legality of
statehood and government, ipso facto, arise from the objectively
real existence of States and governments- in somewhat the same
manner as Athena sprang, full-grown, from the forehead of Zeus;
a sort of legal parthenogenesis. 8 4
Self-existence of States and governments may be conceded in
the context of their internal municipal affairs. 85 Their existence,
however, insofar as other States and governments are concerned,
is a fact which must be determined by competent authority.286 This
fact exists, in law, only if so determined. 28 7 In practice, moreover,
international recognition is considered to be a condition precedent
to the attribution of the consequences of legality of statehood and
government. 88 The majority of cases which have attributed the
consequences of legality of statehood or government to acts of un-
recognized States or governments, have done so on theories of repre-
sentation. 289 In these cases, therefore, the condition precedent, of
international recognition, must be deemed to have been met.
27 See authorities cited note 274 supra.
28 0 See pts. IV B 3, 4 infra.
28 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 270, at 139-40; Kunz, supra note 271; Meeker, supra
note 271.
28 2 Kunz, supra note 271.
See authorities cited note 281 supra.
284D. O'CONNELL, supra note 270, at 139-40.
2 Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523 (1827) ; McIlvaine v. Coxe's Lessee,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 208 (1808) ; J. HERVEY, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-10 (1928); D. O'CONNELL, supra note 270, at 94;
Fraenkel, The Juristic Status of Foreign States, Their Property and Their Acts, 25
COLUM. L. REv. 544 (1925) ; Kunz, supra note 271.
288See note 273 supra.
287 See note 273 supra.
28 See notes 272-73 supra and note 292 infra.
289 See pts. IV B 3 and 4 infra.
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Equation of the objective existence of States and governments
with their legal existence is but one of the errors of the declaratory
theory. According to this theory, the judiciary is competent to deter-
mine the fact of legal existence of international entities.2 9
Yet, it is clear that international recognition is an indispensa-
ble prerequisite to the legal existence of States and governments,
vis-a-vis other States and governments.2 1' That is to say, a State
or government exists, insofar as other States and governments are
concerned, only in relation to the States or governments which have
granted it international recognition. It further is clear, that the
only authority competent to grant, or withhold, international recog-
nition of a State or government, is the political department of the
recognizing State. 92 Moreover, since the State has a unitary juristic
personality, its judiciary is bound by the granting, or withholding,
by its political department, of international recognition.
293
Adherents of the declaratory theory do not dispute the exclu-
sive power of the political department of a State to grant, or with-
hold, international recognition. 29 4  They further agree that inter-
national recognition absolutely requires attribution, to the recog-
nized entity, of the consequences of legality of statehoood or gov-
ernment. 9 5 They assert, however, that these consequences of legality
can be attributed, by the judiciary, to non-recognized entities whose
objective existence has been established by the judiciary.29 6
The only possible legal justification for this assertion, is the
290D. O'CONNELL, supra note 270, at 139-40, 181-82; See pt. IV B 3, infra. See, e.g.,
M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933) ; Soko-
loff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924) ; Upright v. Mercury
Business Mach. Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1961).
291 See notes 272-73 supra and pts. IV B 3, 4 infra.
292 See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938) ; Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) ; Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205 U.S. 257
(1907); Duff Dev. Co. v. Government of Kelantan, [1924] A.C. 797 (H.L.);
Taylor v. Barcley, 2 Sim. *213 (1828) ; Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate, Ltd.
[1900] 1 Ch. 811; The Annette, The Dora, [19193 P. 105; Dickinson, The Unrecog-
nized Government or State in English and American Law, 22 MIcH. L. REV. 29, 118
(1923). The above cases expressly disapprove the few cases in which judicial deter-
mination of the facts of existence of a State or Government was made.
29
3 See note 292 supra. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1941).
24 See, e.g., M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679
(1933); Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924);
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259
(1923); Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372,
138 N.E. 24 (1923).
295 See, e.g., United States v. President and Directors of the Manhattan Co., 276 N.Y.
396, 12 N.E.2d 518 (1938) ; Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 266 N.Y. 71,
193 N.E. 897 (1934); M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186
N.E. 679 (1933). See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) ; Wulfsohn
v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923).
296 See, e.g., M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679
'(1933); Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924);
Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E.




fallacious theory that attribution of the consequences of legality of
statehood or government is not constitutive of the quality of le-
gality.29 For, public policy bars the judiciary from nullifying the
exercise, by the political department of a State, of the latter's exclu-
sive power to determine whether an international entity shall be
considered to have legal existence.298 Yet, the attribution, to an
international entity, of the consequences of legality of statehood or
government, is constitutive of its legal existence.299
This error arises from a misconception of the basis of decision
of the pre-Russian Revolution non-recognition cases, in which legal
effect was given to acts of non-recognized international entities."°°
These cases were not decided on the broad principle that the acts
of the non-recognized entities had objective effects which the courts,
in justice, could not disregard."0' Rather, they were decided on the
theory that the non-recognized entities, as a matter of law, were
acting as representatives of recognized entities.3 02
This theory of representative recognition is the most feasible
solution to the impasse created by the attribution, to unrecognized
entities, of the consequences of legality of statehood or government.
On the one hand, failure of the constitutive theory to realize that
there are degrees of legality, has resulted in the theory that a state
or governmental act can be treated as such only if performed by a
duly authorized agent of a recognized State or government. On the
other hand, the objective realities theory fails to realize that at-
tributing to an entity the consequences of legality of statehood or
government constitutes that entity a State or government, insofar
29See, e.g., Russian Reins. Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149, 158, 147 N.E. 703, 705
(1925).
28 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1941); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1936) ; In re Luks, 45 Misc. 2d 72, 256 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1965) ; Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung
v. Rayner & Keeler, Ltd. (No. 2), [19661 3 W.L.R. 125 (H.L.), rev'g on other
grounds, [1965] 1 Ch. 596 (C.A.). See also 4 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 328 (1966).
99 See note 274 supra and pts. II, III, IV A supra; In re Luks, 45 Misc. 2d 72,
256 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sur. Ct. 1965). O'Connell, moreover, concedes that judicial attri-
bution of the consequences of legality of statehood or government to unrecognized
entities is, or may be, violative of the public policy vesting exclusive recognitive
powers in the political department. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 270, 181-82. As a
matter of practical politics, it further should be noted that non-recognition fre-
quently stems from a desire to exercise coercion on the non-recognized entity; not
from such entity's lack of objective existence. In these cases, it is especially important
for the judiciary to implement executive policy. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
v. National City Bank, 41 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
300 See pt. IV B 4 infra.
301 See pts. IV B 3, 4 infra. See, e.g., for a statement of the broad general principle,
M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 18 N.E. 679 (1933); Russian
Reins. Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925).
3
02See pt. IV B 4 infra. See, e.g., Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454 (1878) ; Williams v.
Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1877); Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1 (1868);
Pepin v. Lachenmeyer, 45 N.Y. 27 (1871) ; United States ex rel. Hopkins v. United
Mexican States, (General Claims Comm'n, U.S. and Mexico, 1926) 21 AM. J. INT'L
L. 160 (1927) ; Silvanie, Responsibility of States for Acts of Insurgent Governments,
33 Am. J. INT'L L. 78 (1939).
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as the attributing entity is concerned, irrespective of the granting of
international recognition. Correlatively, the objective realities theory
fails to realize that, insofar as the law is concerned, there are no
objective realities; reality is only that which is recognized by the
law as such. These failures of the objective realities theory have
resulted in recognition, by the judiciary, of the existence of States
and governments whose non-existence is recognized, or constituted,
by its political department.
Representative recognition, however, avoids the pitfalls of both
the constitutive and objective realities theories. It permits the at-
tribution of the consequences of legality of statehood or govern-
ment to factual situations which do not comply, strictly, with the
conditions prerequisite to the existence of statehood or government.
Yet, by treating unrecognized entities as if they were the duly consti-
tuted agents of recognized entities, it avoids recognition of the
former as entities distinct from the latter.
This approach to international recognition parallels the tri-
partite treatment of public officers - as de jure, de facto, and usur-
pers. And, as is the case with the de facto public officer doctrine,
representative recognition intrinsically is a doctrine of generalized
estoppel.
Moreover, the results, in many cases, would be identical with
those flowing from application of the broad principle requiring
acknowledgment of objective realities. 3 ' Furthermore, use of this
theory, as a basis for decision, would increase the number of situa-
tions in which legal effect properly could be given to acts of un-
recognized entities. For example, the ministerial acts of unrecog-
nized governments, to which legal effect has been denied in cases
involving the non-recognition of incorporation of the Baltic States
into the U.S.S.R.,.. 4 properly could be given legal effect under
this theory.30°
On the other hand, application of this theory would deny the
quality of legality to those non-recognition situations which public
303 Cf. Upright v. Mercury Business Mach. Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417
(1961) ; Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler, Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 W.L.R. 125
(H.L.). Both cases gave legal effect to acts of the unrecognized East German govern-
ment. Yet, Upright did so on the theory that the unrecognized government has -de
facto existence which is juridically cognizable," whereas Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung consid-
ered the unrecognized government to be acting as agent for the recognized govern-
ment of the U.S.S.R.
304 See, e.g., In re Luks, 45 Misc. 2d 72, 256 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sur. Ct. 1965); In re
Kapocius' Estate, 36 Misc. 2d 1087, 234 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sur. Ct. 1962) ; In re Mitz-
kel's Estate, 36 Misc. 2d 671, 233 N.Y.S. 2d 519 (Sur. Ct. 1962); In re Braun-
stein's Estate, 202 Misc. 244, 114 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sur. Ct. 1952); In re Adler's
Estate, 197 Misc. 104, 93 N.Y.S.2d 416 (Sur. Ct. 1949).
305 See, e.g., Agricultural Cooperative Ass'n of Lithuania Lietukis v. The Denny, 127




policy bars from being characterized as legal. It would preclude,
for example, such decisions as Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank
& Union Trust Co.80  In this case, a federal district court, on the
theory that objective realities are the paramount consideration, per-
mitted the unrecognized Communist Government of China to inter-
vene in an action, brought by the recognized Nationalist Govern-
ment of China, to recover funds deposited with the defendant by
the Bank of China, a government-controlled entity. The court, more-
over, felt constrained to justify its award of the funds to the Na-
tionalist Government by a finding of fact that it has objective exist-
ence as a government of China. Yet, it is clear, in such a case as
this, application of the objective realities theory is subversive of
executive policy.
It would appear, therefore, that acceptance of representative
recognition, as the sole permissible alternative to international
recognition, is the most equitable method of reconciling the exi-
gencies of individual justice with the imperatives of national politi-
cal policy; of recognizing degrees of legality of statehood and
government, while avoiding the situation in which the existence of
an entity is constituted by the judiciary of a State whose executive
constituted the entity's non-existence.
3. International Recognition - All or Nothing
Until quite recently, the judiciary has failed to appreciate the
applicability of the doctrine of representative recognition.3 0 7 This
failure has caused the judicial approach to the legal effects of non-
recognition to evolve in two sharply divergent directions.
a. The Ministerial Approach - Equation of Judicial Existence
with Political Existence
The unyielding approach of the British judiciary is that, in the
absence of international recognition, States and governments must
be viewed as legally non-existent; as judicially non-cognizable."' 5
This view arises from two undisputed principles. First, the power
to grant, or withhold, international recognition belongs exclusively
to the political department of a State.309 Second, the determination
30892 F. Supp. 920 (N.D. Cal. 1950), remanded for reconsideration, 190 F.2d 1010
(9th Cir. 1951), subsequent decision in light of remand, 104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Cal.
1952).
307 The only recent overt application of representative recognition giving legal effect to
the acts of a non-connected, non-recognized entity, is Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner &
Keeler, Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 W.L.R. 125 (H.L.).
308 Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler, Ltd. (No. 2), [1965] 1 Ch. 596 (CA.),
reVid on other grounds, [1966] 3 W.L.R. 125 (H.L.); Luther v. James Sagor &
Co., (1921] 1 K.B. 456; Foster v. Glove Venture Syndicate, Ltd., [1900] 1 Ch. 811;
Taylor v. Barclay, I Sim. *213 (1828) ; Thompson v. Powles, 2 Sim. *194 (1828) ;
Dolder v. Bank of England, [1805] 10 Ves. Jr. 352; Berne v. Bank of England,
[1804] 9 Ves. 347.
3o9 See cases cited note 292 supra.
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of the political department, with reference to the existence of other
States or governments, as evidenced by its granting, or withholding,
of international recognition is conclusive upon the judiciary of the
determining State."' According to this view, the function of the
judiciary, in cases in which the existence of other States, or govern-
ments, is a relevant factor, is purely ministerial. International recog-
nition is constitutive of judicial cognizability."' Lack of international
recognition is constitutive of judicial non-existence. 1 This approach
has received sporadic approval from the American courts.3 13
The principal difficulty with this approach is the unfortunate
effect of its application to questions of status, over which the indi-
vidual concerned has little or no control.31 4 It is more difficult to
sympathize with those individuals who knowingly have purchased
property from an unrecognized entity, or from one whose title de-
rived from such entity.
31 5
b. The Discretionary Approach - Objective realities can cause
the juridical cognizability of international entities to which
international recognition has not been accorded.
The American courts are the principal exponents of the doc-
trine that a "foreign government, although not recognized by the
political arm of the .. .Government, may nevertheless have de facto
existence which is juridically cognizable.-"' This doctrine first was
expounded during the era which followed the Russian Revolution
and preceded international recognition of the U.S.S.R. by the United
States.31 1 It has been formulated as follows:
Whether or not a government exists, clothed with the power to
enforce its authority within its own territory, obeyed by the people
310 See note 293 supra.
311 Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [19211 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.) ; Bank of Ethiopia v.
National Bank of Egypt and Ligouri, [1937] 1 Ch. 513.
312 Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 1 K.B. 456; Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner &
Keeler, Ltd. (No. 2), [19651 1 Ch. 596 (C.A.), rev'd on other grounds, [1966] 3
W.L.R. 125 (H.L.).
313 See, e.g., Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38 (1852) ; The Nueva Anna
and Liebre, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 193 (1821) ; The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
52 (1819); Estonian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. United States, 116 F.
Supp. 447 (Ct. Cl. 1953) ; Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath,
188 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944) ; cases
cited note 304, supra. See also Dickinson, The Unrecognized Government or State
in English and American Law, 22 Micus. L. REV. 29, 118 (1923).
31 4 See D. O'CONNELL, supra note 270, at 195-97.
315 Cf. M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933);
Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 1 K.B. 456.
316 Upright v. Mercury Business Mach. Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 39, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417,
419 (1961).
317 See, e.g., Banque De France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F.2d 202 '(S.D.N.Y. 1929);
M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933);
In re First Russian Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 428, 175 N.E. 118 (1931) ; Petrogradsky
Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E.
479 (1930) ; James & Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 262, 160 N.E. 364 (1928) ;
Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158 (1924) ;*Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923).
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over whom it rules, capable of performing the duties and fulfilling
the obligations of an independent power, able to enforce its claims
by military force, is a fact, not a theory.318
Exhibitions of power may be followed or attended by physical
changes, legal or illegal. These we do not ignore, however lawless
their origin, in any survey of the legal scene. They are a source at
times of new rights and liabilities.... The everyday transactions of
business or domestic life are not subject to impeachment, though
the form may have been regulated by the command of the usurping
government.... To undo them would bring hardship or confusion
to the helpless and the innocent without compensating benefit.8 19
Yet, of these cases which involved the acts or decrees of the
unrecognized Soviet government, only four can be said to have
been decided on the basis of this doctrine. 32° And, only one of
the four cases is justifiable solely on a theory of acknowledgment
of objective realities.
3 2 1
Of the other cases, two involved alternate grounds of decision.
One apparently rests on the ground that the proceeding was an
equitable one, in which not all of the proper parties were joined,
thus subjecting the defendant to possible double liability.32 2 The
other involved a different alternate ground of decision: that plain-
tiff, a French citizen, whose government had recognized the U.S.S.R.,
might thereby be precluded from suing to recover gold, deposited
in a New York bank by the unrecognized Soviet government, which
had confiscated the gold from a Russian bank, wherein it had been
deposited by plaintiff prior to the Revolution.
3 2 3
The third case was decided solely on the ground that "[tQhe
Soviet decree restoring the gold standard is to be ranked with those
every-day transactions of business or domestic life' that 'are not
subject to impeachment, though the form may have been regulated
by the command of the usurping government.' ,324 Yet, clearly, this
type of currency regulation is entitled to be given legal effect on
the theory that the Soviet government was acting as a representa-
3 18 Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 375, 138
N.E. 24, 25 (1923).
319 Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y.
23, 28, 170 N.E. 479, 481 (1930).
320 Banque De France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F.2d 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) ; M. Sali-
moff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933); In re
First Russian Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 428, 175 N.E. 118 (1931) ; Russian Reins. Co. v.
Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925), motion for reargument denied, 240
N.Y. 682, 148 N.E. 757 (1925).
32 M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933), which
involved title to property within the U.S.S.R. at the time of its confiscation, but
within New York at the time of trial of the action.
322 Russian Reins. Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925). See for basis
of distinction, People v. Russian Reins. Co., 225 N.Y. 415, 175 N.E. 114 (1931);
In re Second Russian Ins. Co., 250 N.Y. 449, 166 N.E. 163 (1929) ; First Russian
Ins. Co. v. Beha, 240 N.Y. 601, 148 N.E. 722 (1925).
323 Banque De France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F.2d 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
3
24 In re First Russian Ins. Co., 155 N.Y. 428, 175 N.E. 118 (1931).
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tive of a recognized government.3" 5 Thus, the case cannot be said
to be authority for the general proposition that objective realities
can cause the juridical cognizability of non-recognized entities.
Two additional cases, it is true, gave legal effect to ministerial
acts of the Soviet government. Neither, however, referred to the
objective realities doctrine. One of them held that certificates, made
before a notary in Russia, were admissible, as affidavits, in a fed-
eral court. 26 However, it is difficult to determine whether these
certificates were admissible in spite of being made before an officer
of an unrecognized government, or because they were validated by
the retroactivity of Russia's recognition, or because they were made
after Russia was recognized.3 2 1  Moreover, notarization of certifi-
cates is a ministerial act to which legal effect may be given on the
theory of representative recognition."2 The other case gave legal
effect to birth certificates authenticated by officials of the non-
recognized Soviet government," 9 but only because supported by
other proof of birth.
The remainder of the Russian recognition cases denied legal
effect to acts and decrees of the Soviet government, on the ground
of non-recognition, simultaneously enunciating, with great vigor,
the theory that, under other circumstances, objective realities would
require legal effect to be given to these acts and decrees.
3 0
32See, e.g., Delmas v. Ins. Co. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 661 (1871) ; Thorington v. Smith,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1 (1868) ; pt. IV B 4 infra.
3 2GAmtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
32 Id.
328 See pt. IV B 4 infra.
3 2OWerenjchik v. Ulen Contracting Corp., 229 App. Div. 36, 240 N.Y.S. 619 (1930).
330 Non-recognition held to preclude an unrecognized government from being either a
party plaintiff or a party defendant in any action or proceeding brought in the courts
of the non-recognizing state. Nankivel v. Omsk All-Russian Gov't, 237 N.Y. 150,
142 N.E. 569 (1923) ; Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235
N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923) ; Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923). See also The Rogdai, 278 F. 294
(N.D. Cal. 1920). Non-recognition further held to render Soviet confiscatory decrees
ineffective to terminate the corporate existence of banks or insurance companies,
whether incorporated in Russia and doing business in the United States, or incorpor-
ated in the United States and doing business in Russia. In re Northern Ins. Co..
255 N.Y. 433, 175 N.E. 120 (1931) ; People v. Russian Reins. Co., 255 N.Y. 415,
175 N.E. 114 (1931); Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. Na-
tional City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 470 (1930); In re Second Russian
Ins. Co., 250 N.Y. 449, 116 N.E. 163 (1929); Fred S. James & Co. v. Rossia
Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 262, 160 N.E. 364 (1928); Joint Stock Co. v. National
City Bank, 240 N.Y. 368, 148 N.E. 552 (1925) ; Fred S. James & Co. v.
Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N.Y. 248, 146 N.E. 369 (1925); Sokoloff v. Na-
tional City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158 (1924). These decrees, moreover, were held to be
ineffective to affect the title to property situated in the United States at the time when
they were enacted. See cases cited supra this paragraph. See also Severnoe Sec. Corp.
v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 174 N.E. 299 (1931). In this con-
nection, it is of interest to note that subsequent to the recognition of the U.S.S.R. legal
effect also was denied to the extraterritorial operation of these decrees. Moscow Fire
Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d 758 (1939);
United States v. President & Directors of the Manhattan Co., 276 N.Y. 396, 12
N.E.2d 518 (1938) ; Vladikavkazsky R.R. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369,
189 N.E. 456 (1934). This accords with the general rule that extraterritorial effect
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The objective realities theory has received only sporadic accept-
ance in the American courts since the era of non-recognition of the
U.S.S.R. The first opportunity for its application arose in the Baltic
cases - those involving the failure of the United States to recognize
the incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, into the U.S.S.R.
These cases fall into three categories.
The first denies extraterritorial effect to the nationalization
decrees of the new, non-recognized, governments,88* on the ground
that these governments were unrecognized. 38  It is clear, however,
that the decisions would have been the same had these governments
been recognized.
3 3
The second group of cases denied legal effect to the ministerial
acts of the non-recognized governments, equating non-recognition
with judicial non-existence."8 The third group, however, adhering
to the objective realities theory, reached a contrary result.8 5 It gave
legal effect to such ministerial acts. This group also includes the
decisions permitting New York corporations, as agents of the non-
recognized governments, to bring actions, in federal courts, on be-
half of their principals. 8 6
The most extraordinary extension of the objective realities
theory occured in Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust
Co. 3 37 Implicit in the court's opinion is the intimation that, had it
been unable to hold that the recognized claimant government also
was one in fact, it would have felt constrained to acknowledge ob-
jective realities by awarding the funds in controversy to the non-
recognized claimant government.88 8 Yet, clearly, an executive policy
of non-recognition requires that, the objective realities notwithstand-
will be denied to the acts of state even of recognized governments. Zwack v. Kraus
Bros. & Co., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 241 F. Supp.
567 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Bollack v. Societe Generale, 263 App. Div. 601, 33 N.Y.S.2d
986 (1942); The Jupiter (No. 3), [1927) P. 122, afpd. [1927) P. 250; The 'El
Comdado,' [19391 63 Lloyd's List. L.R. 330. The United States Supreme Court subse-
quently held that such extraterritorial effect was required by the Litvinov Assignment.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) ; United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937).
331 Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1951) ; The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944) ; The Florida, 133 F.2d 719 (5th
Cir. 1943) ; Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. United States, 116 F. Supp.
717 (Ct. CI. 1953) ; Estonian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. United States,
116 F. Supp. 447 (Ct. C1. 1953); A/S Merilaid & Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 189
Misc. 285, 71 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; In re Grauds' Estate, 43 N.Y.S.2d 803
(Sur. Ct. 1943).
332 See cases cited note 331, supra.
333 See note 330 supra.
334 See cases cited note 304 supra.
335 The Denny, 127 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1942) ; In re Luberg's Estate, 19 App. Div. 2d
370, 243 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1963).
336 The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3rd Cir. 1944). See also Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United
States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934) ; Upright v. Mercury Bus. Mach. Co., 13 App.
Div. 2d 36 (1st Dep't 1961).
337 For the facts in this case, see the textual material pertaining to note 306 supra.
338 104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
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ing, the recognized government always must prevail in any contro-
versy between itself and its unrecognized counterpart. 3 9
The most recent application of the objective realities theory is
to be found in Upright v. Mercury Business Machines Co., Inc. 4"
The case involved an action by the assignee of a trade acceptance,
drawn on and accepted by the defendant in payment for typewriters,
sold to it by an East German corporation, allegedly a creature of
the non-recognized East German government. The New York Appel-
late Division held that allegations of non-recognition of the East
German government are insufficient, standing alone, to avoid liability
on transactions with such government. According to the opinion of
the court, a valid defense must assert a violation of public policy
with respect either to the underlying sale, or to the assignment of
the trade acceptances. The court said, inter alia:
A foreign government, although not recognized by the politi-
cal arm of the United States Government, may nevertheless have
de facto existence which is juridically cognizable .... The lack of
jural status for such government or its creature corporation is not
determinative of whether transactions with it will be denied en-
forcement in American courts, so long as the government is not the
suitor.
3 4 1
The result in Upright clearly is correct. Yet the reasoning of
the court goes beyond the necessities of the situation. It would
have been sufficient to say, as did the English courts in a similar
situation, that the acts of the East German government are entitled
to be given legal effect in their character, by attribution, as acts of
the recognized government of the U.S.S.R. 4 2
The objective realities theory has been adopted outside the
United States, although not expressed in precisely the same man-
ner.3 3 The result, in these cases, is to attribute to a non-recognized
government a civil personality, distinct from its official personality.
44
339See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Union of
Socialist Republics v. National City Bank, 41 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
340 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1961).
341 Id. at 38, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
342 Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler, Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 W.L.R. 125 (H.L.)
Greig, The Carl-Zeiss Case and the Position of an Unrecognized Government in
English Law, 83 LAW Q. REv. 96 (1967).
343See, e.g., In re Sack, Case No. 35 (Argentine, Camara Federal of Rosario Nov. 11,
1936) reprinted in 1935-1937, LAUTERPACHT, ANN. DIG. & REPORTS OF PUBLIC INT'L
LAW CASES at 117; 'Exportchleb' Ltd. v. Goudeket, Case No. 36 (Holland, Dist. Ct.,
Amsterdam, Feb. 15, 1935) reprinted in 1935-1937, LAUTERPACHT, ANN. DIG. &
REPORTS OF PUBLIC INT'L LAW CASES at 117; Russian Trade Delegation in Turkey
v. Levant Red Sea Coal Co., Case No. 35 (Egypt, Tribunal of Alex., Mar. 1933)
reprinted in 1933-1934, LAUTERPACHT, ANN. DIG. & REPORTS OF PUBLIC INT'L
LAW CASES at 82.
S44'Exportchleb' Ltd. v. Goudeket, Case No. 36 (Holland, Dist. Ct., Amsterdam Feb. 15,
1935) reprinted in 1935-1937, LAUTERPACHT, ANN. DIG. & REPORTS OF PUBLIC
INT'L LAW CASES at 117; Russian Trade Delegation in Turkey v. Levant Red Sea
Coal Co., Case No. 35 (Egypt, Tribunal of Alex., Mar. 1933) reprinted in 1933-
1934, LAUTERPACHT, ANN. DIG. & REPORTS OF PUBLIC INT'L LAW CASES at 82.
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4. International Recognition- The Golden Mean
The objective realities approach to non-recognition situations
is an extreme reaction to the orthodox approach: that non-recogni-
tion of an international entity causes it to be judicially non-cognizable.
Until recently, the exponents of neither approach would acknowl-
edge the existence of a third alternative a 45 Yet, this alternative
exists. Moreover, its establishment, as the standard for determining
whether to attribute the consequences of legality to non-recognition
situations, is essential to the elimination of the difficulties inherent
in the existing approaches.
This third alternative nay be termed representati\ e recognition.
It is an expression of the principle, long established in international
law, of continuity of the State. This principle requires the limited
attribution, to non-recognition situations, of the consequences of
legality of statehood or government. To the extent that it requires
this attribution, it is a valid substitute for international recognition
as a condition precedent thereto, and constitutes an adequate stand-
ard for determining the legal effects of non-recognition situations.
Moreover, application of this standard is inherently incapable of
contravening the policy of the political department.
In this connection, however, it must be borne in mind that the
principle of continuity of the State customarily is applied under
two sets of circumstances. On the one hand, it is applied by the
parent State, or recognized government. On the other, it is applied
by an unrelated State. Both varieties of application may be made
either before or after the cessation of hostilities. The conditions
precedent to the former type of application are not necessarily
identical with those of the latter. For the latter type of application
involves policy considerations not involved in the former - at least
when the former occurs after the cessation of hostilities. To wit,
the necessity of the unrelated entity to avoid affront to the recog-
nized entity, or inadvertent recognition of the non-recognized entity.
a. Continuity of the State - Representative Recognition
Inherent in the nature of a State, within the meaning of inter-
national law, is the possession of a government.3 46 Hence, inter-
national recognition of statehood, whether initial or continued, im-
plies that the entity, recognized as a State, has a government.
347
Moreover, changes in the government of a State, whether accom-
plished in a constitutional manner or by revolution, do not interrupt
the legal continuity of the State, insofar as international law is
345 Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 W.L.R. 125 (H.L.).




concerned. 48 Nor do they affect the rights or liabilities of the State,
since the State is the actual owner of the property, its government
being but the representative of the national sovereignty. 4 '
Hence, where there has been an objectively real, but unrecog-
nized, change in the government of a recognized State, the judi-
ciaries of non-related States must consider "the ancient state of
things as remaining unaltered," until international recognition of this
change has been granted by their political departments.3 50 For ex-
ample, where a government continues to be recognized as such,
despite the fact that it has been overthrown, its diplomatic repre-
sentatives must be considered as the accredited representatives of
the State,3"' entitled to sue on its behalf.
35 2
Moreover, upon international recognition of an objectively real
change in the government of a recognized State, the newly recog-
nized government is considered as a continuation of the formerly
recognized government. 53 It succeeds to the property, rights, and
liabilities of the State, as the agent thereof, by right of representa-
tion.354 It further is entitled to be substituted for the formerly-
recognized government in pending litigation involving the rights
of the State.355 And, its right to sue, on a claim belonging to the
State, is barrable by the running of the Statute of Limitations against
348 Id. at 264.
49 See, e.g., The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1870) ; Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v.
Russia, 21 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1927), af'g 293 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); Haile Selas-
sie v. Cable & Wireless Ltd. (No. 2), [19391 1 Ch. 182 (C.A.). See also Guaranty
Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126'(1938) ; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
v. National City Bank, 41 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
3 5
0Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38 (1852) ; Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 240 (1808); Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. Russia, 21 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1927) ;
Clark v. United States, 5 F. Cas. 932 (No. 2838) (D. Pa. 1811). See also Dahan &
Dorra Bros. v. Tchoureff, Case No. 34 (Egypt Ct. App., 1st Chamber, June 24, 1936)
reprinted in 1935-1937 LAUTERPACHT, ANN. DIG. & REPORTS OF PUBLIC INT'L LAW
CASES at 115; Lesser v. Rotterdamsche Bank (Ct. 1st Instance Rotterdam, The Nether-
lands Dec. 30, 1953), 2 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Int'l Recht 420, 50 AM. J. INT'L
L. 441 (1956).
351 Russian Gov't v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 293 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) ; ajf'd, 21
F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1927); Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v. American Can Co., 253
F. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); United States v. Trumbull, 48 F. 94 (S.D. Cal. 1891).
352 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938) ; Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics v. National City Bank, 41 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) ; Russian Gov't
v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 293 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) ; Canadian Car & Foundry
Co. v. American Can Co., 253 F.152 (S-D.N.Y. 1918).
353 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938) ; The Sapphire, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 164 (1870) ; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics v. National City Bank,
41 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) ; Haile Selassie v. Cable & Wireless Ltd. (No. 2),
[19391 1 Ch. 182 (C.A.).
354 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); The Sapphire, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 164 (1870) ; Haile Selassie v. Cable & Wireless Ltd. (No. 2), [19391
1 Ch. 182 (C.A.).
355 The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1870) ; Haile Selassie v. Cable & Wireless
Ltd. (No. 2), [1939] 1 Ch. 182 (C.A.).
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its recognized predecessor, despite the fact that it was precluded,
by non-recognition, from bringing timely suit.856
Correlatively, the perpetual legal continuity of a recognized
State requires that it be bound by, and responsible for, the acts of
its government. 57 Similarly, a recognized government is bound by,
and responsible for, the acts of its predecessors.3 58 These principles
apply to the acts of a recognized government.59 They also apply
to the acts of a non-recognized government which, thereafter, is
accorded international recognition. 0  They further apply, to a
limited extent, to the acts of a government which, although never
accorded international recognition, has succeeded in establishing
itself in power. 8 ' They even are applicable, in yet a lesser degree,
to the acts of a government which neither succeeded in establishing
itself in power, nor ever was accorded international recognition.862
Their application, in the latter two situations, might be described
as representative recognition. For, it depends upon the extent to
which the de facto power can be deemed to be acting as the repre-
sentative of the recognized government.
Thus, international recognition, although retroactive in effect,
validating all the actions of the newly recognized government from
the actual commencement of its existence, 6 3 cannot operate to
nullify any actions properly taken, prior to such recognition, by the
356 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938) ; Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics v. National City Bank, 41 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); cf. Steingut v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 58 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), holding that, where the
claim sued upon belonged originally to the Russo-Asiatic Bank, rather than to the
formerly-recognized government of Russia, the latter could not have sued upon the
claim during the period of non-recognition of the U.S.S.R.; that the statute of limita-
tions does not start to run until there exists someone capable of enforcing the claim;
and that, therefore, the Soviet Government, which acquired the claim by confiscation
during the period of its non-recognition, was not barred by the statute of limitations
from suing thereon, since it could not have brought suit until recognized.
357 Peru v. Dreyfus Bros. & Co., [18881 38 Ch. D. 348; Republic of Peru v. Peruvian
Guano Co., [1887] 36 Ch. D. 489; The King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox. 1 Sim.
'(n.s.) *301 (1851) ; Silvanie, Responsibility of States for Acts of Insurgent Govern-
ments, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1939) ; Stinson, Recognition of De Facto Govern-
ments and the Responsibility of States, 9 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1924).
358 Peru v. Dreyfus Bros. & Co., [1888] 38 Ch. D. 348; Republic of Peru v. Peruvian
Guano Co., [18871 36 Ch. D. 489; see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304
U.S. 126 (1938).
359 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Peru v. Dreyfus Bros.
& Co., [18881 38 Ch. D. 348; Civil Air Transp. Inc. v. Central Air Transp. Corp.,
[1952] 2 All E.R. 733 (P.C.), affd, [1953) A.C. 70; Gdynia Ameryka Linie
Zeglugowe Spolka Akcyjna v. Boguslawski, [1953] A.C. 11, affg, [1950) 2 All
E.R. 355 (C.A.) ; Stinson, supra note 357.
360 Silvanie, supra note 357. See also cases cited note 363, infra.
361 The King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 1 Sim. (n.s.) *301 (1851) ; D. O'CoN-
NELL, supra note 270, at 99-102; Silvanie, supra note 357; Stinson, supra note 357.
362 United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819) ; D. O'CONNELL, supra note
270, at 99-102; Silvanie, supra note 357.
363 Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297 (1918) ; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) ; Yucatan v.
Argumendo, 92 Misc. 547, 157 N.Y.S. 219 (Sup. Ct. 1915) ; Luther v. James Sagor
& Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 532 '(C.A.).
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previously recognized government on behalf of the State.3" 4 Nor
can the newly recognized government, by its unilateral action sub-
sequent to recognition, nullify, or disclaim responsibility for, acts
of its recognized predecessor- at least insofar as these acts affect
non-related States, or their subjects.365 Provided that the prior gov-
ernment is recognized before it is supplanted, its status when these
acts occur is irrelevant to the operation of the rule. 66
Moreover, the acts of a successfully established, but never-
recognized, government, affecting non-related States or their sub-
jects, are binding upon the State and its successor recognized gov-
ernment. 67
The extent to which a State, and its recognized government,
are bound by, and responsible for, the acts of a prior government,
which failed either to establish itself or to receive recognition, is
more difficult to determine. The problem has been presented in
two contexts. On the one hand, it is raised in the courts of the parent
State. On the other, it arises in the courts of non-related States.
(1) Attitude of the Parent State
The United States courts, for instance, in the post-Civil War
era, gave legal effect to numerous acts of the seceded States, as
distinguished from the Confederacy. Although their reasoning, in
many cases, was based only impliedly upon the principle of legal
continuity of the State, 8 in many others it was based expressly
upon this principle. 69
(a) Legal Continuity of the State by Implication -Necessity
The reasoning of this approach appears to be that (1) every
State must have a government to preserve order, and to perform
certain other indispensable governmental functions; (2) the su-
384 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938) ; Civil Air Transp. Inc.
v. Central Air Transp. Corp., [19531 A.C. 70; Gdynia Ameryka Linie Zeglugowe
Spolka Akcyjna v. Boguslawski, [1953] A.C. 11. However, actions of the previously
recognized government, which affect persons or property then situate under the con-
trol of the newly recognized government, are nullified by subsequent recognition of
the latter government. Id.
3 Peru v. Dreyfus Bros. & Co., ['1888] 38 Ch. D. 348; Republic of Peru v. Peruvian
Guano Co., [1887] 36 Ch. D. 489; Silvanie, supra note 357.
368 Peru v. Dreyfus Bros. & Co., [1888) 38 Ch. D. 348; Republic of Peru v. Peruvian
Guano Co., [1887] 36 Ch. D. 489; Silvanie, supra note 357.
367 Silvanie, supra note 357; Stinson, supra note 357; Arbitration Between Great Britain
and Costa Rica, Opinion and Award of William H. Taft, Sole Arbitrator, 18 AM. J.
INT'L L. 147 (1924).
368 Baldy v. Hunter, 170 U.S. 388 (1897); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1877);
Delmas v. Ins. Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 661 (1871); Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 1 (1868); Mauran v. Ins. Co., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 1 (1867). See also
United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819).
369See, e.g., Ketchum v. Buckley, 99 U.S. 188 (1878); Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454
(1878) ; Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1877); United States v. Ins. Cos., 89
U.S. (22 Wall.) 99 (1874).
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premacy of insurgents or invaders, over the territory occupied by
them, necessitates the obedience of its occupants to acts and de-
crees not hostile to the legitimate government; (3) therefore, to
the extent only that a non-recognized government performs these
indispensable governmental functions, which the legitimate govern-
ment is unable to perform, its acts must be given the same force
and effect as if performed by the legitimate government.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court indicated that it would
give legal effect to those rebel acts and decrees relating to the
preservation of order; maintenance of police regulations; prosecu-
tion of crimes; protection of property; enforcement of contracts;
celebration of marriages; settlement of estates; transfer and descent
of property; and related matters. 37  Specifically it did, in fact, give
effect to the issuance of currency;... investment by a guardian, of
Confederate funds of his ward, in Confederate bonds; 3 2 and the
imposition of customs duties.373  In this connection, the United
States Supreme Court stated:
To the extent, then, of actual supremacy, however unlawfully gained,
in all matters of government within its military lines, the power
of the insurgent government cannot be questioned. That supremacy
did not justify acts of hostility to the United States.... But it made
obedience to its authority, in civil and local matters, not only a
necessity but a duty. Without such obedience, civil order was im-
possible ...
They are transactions in the ordinary course of civil society,
and, though they may indirectly and remotely promote the ends of
the unlawful government, are without blame, except when proved
to have been entered into with actual intent to further invasion or
insurrection.3 74
This approach of the United States Supreme Court was adopted
as one of the bases of decision in Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke;
Baron v. Ayre.375 These cases, arising before the Crown appointed
and authorized High Court of Rhodesia, involved the legality of
the acts of the non-recognized government of Southern Rhodesia
in detaining plaintiffs without trial. Consequently, they involved
the legality of the non-recognized government itself, in view of its
unilateral abandonment of its status as a British colony. Although
declaring illegal the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith, and the
3
70 Baldy v. Hunter, 170 U.S. 388 (1897).
371Delmas v. Ins. Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 661 ('1871); Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 1 (1868).
372 Baldy v. Hunter, 170 U.S. 388 (1897). Contra, Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. (17
Wall.) 570 (1873) (where the funds invested were non-Confederate in origin).
3 3 United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819).
374Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1, 11-12, (1868). See also United States v.
Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819).
1 N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1966 § 1, at 1, cols. 2-3, id. at 10, cols. 4-6; Welsh, The Con-
stitutional Case in Southern Rhodesia, 83 LAW Q. REV. 64 (1967).
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1965 Constitution enacted by it, the High Court ruled that legal
effect must be given to "such measures of the effective government,
both legislative and administrative, as could lawfully have been
taken by the lawful government under the 1961 Constitution for
the preservation of peace and good government and the maintenance
of law and order.
' 8 7 6
Uniformly, however, legal effect has been denied to acts and
decrees, of the insurgent or invading government, which were hos-
tile to the interest of the legitimate government.37 7 Moreover, legal
effect has been denied to the creation, by an insurgent government,
of courts not existing under the legitimate government. 8
(b) Express Application of the Doctrine of Legal Continuity
of the State
The United States Supreme Court held, expressly, in a number
of cases, that the existence of rebellion did not cause the States to
cease to be States, nor their citizens to cease to be citizens of the
Union ;379 that the seceded States, during and after the rebellion,
continued to be the same political organizations, possessing the same
laws and form of government, as prior thereto; 880 and that, there-
fore, all acts of the seceded States, during the period of rebellion,
were valid and binding upon the State thereafter, except when done
in aid of the rebellion, or in conflict with the Constitution or laws
of the United States. 8 ' The distinction is exemplified by two types
of situations. On the one hand, for example, secession was con-
sidered to be incapable of affecting the jurisdiction of the courts
of the seceded States, or their power to render valid judgments.
38 2
On the other hand, confiscation, by the rebels, of the property of
loyal citizens, uniformly was denied legal effect.'
8
This basis of decision also was adopted by the High Court of
Rhodesia, as an additional ground of decision in Madzimbamuto v.
376 N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1966, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
377 Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594 (1878); Dewing v. Perdicaries, 96 U.S. 193 (1877)
Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1877) ; Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
439 (1872); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868). See also United
States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819).
378 Hickman v. Jones, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 197 (1869). See also Dewing v. Perdicaries,
96 U.S. 193 (1877).
3 7 9 Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454 (1878) ; Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
380 Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454 (1878) ; Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1877);
Sprott v. United States, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 459 (1874) ; Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S.
(17 Wall.) 570 (1873).
381 Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454 (1878).
382 Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 570 (1873); White v. Cannon, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 443 (1867).
38Dewing v. Perdicaries, 96 U.S. 193 (1877); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176




Lardner-Burke; Baron v. Ayre."8 ' The court specifically rested its
holding on that in Texas v. White,8 5 to the effect that, notwith-
standing its secession, Texas never ceased to be a State of the Union.
The question remains, however, whether the particular acts of the
non-recognized Rhodesian government, complained of in the instant
case, are required to be recognized by the parent State, even under
the theories advanced in this case. 8 6
(2) Attitude of Non-Related States
Non-related States, moreover, have taken a narrower view of
the acts of insurgents for which the parent State is responsible, or
by which it is bound.
Prior to 1927, the view generally was taken that unsuccessful
insurgents, being in no sense agents of the State, could not bind the
State, or render it liable for their acts.38 7 Necessity, however, re-
quired that certain exceptions be made to this rule. Thus, the legiti-
mate government was not permitted to enforce a second payment
of taxes or customs duties previously collected by the unsuccessful
insurgents.388 Moreover, provided that it receives the benefit thereof,
the State is liable to pay for property seized by the rebels, 8 9 and,
possibly, is bound by a contract made by the rebels with foreigners. 90
And, in order for the State to recover property, acquired by the
rebels after the commencement of the rebellion, and impressed by
them with the character of public property, it must recognize the
authority of the rebels to that extent, and assume the burdens con-
nected with the property.3 '
The General Claims Commission of 1927, in determining the
liability of Mexico for acts of the unsuccessful Huerta administra-
tion, expanded the area of State responsibility. Consequently, the
State further was considered to be bound by all acts of government
routine performed by the unsuccessful rebels.3 92 Included in this
category are the "sale of postage stamps, the registration of letters,
the acceptance of money orders and telegrams (where post and
3 Welsh, supra note 375, at 81-83.
374 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
38 Welsh, supra note 375.
-8Silvanie, supra note 357.
3881d. See also RALSTON & DOYLE, VENEZUELAN ARBITRATIONS OF 1903, Guastini
Case, 730 ('1904).
-389 RALSTON & DOYLE, VENEZUELAN ARBITRATIONS OF 1903, Mazzei Case, 693 (1904).
390 Peru v. Dreyfus Bros. & Co., [18881 38 Ch.D. 348.
391 The King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, [1851] 1 Sim. (n.s.) *301; United States
v. McRae, [1869) L.R. 8 Eq. 68.
39 Cook v. Mexico (General Claims Comm'n, U.S. and Mexico, 1927), 22 AM. J. INT'L
L. 189 (1928); Davies v. Mexico (General Claims Comm'n, U.S. and Mexico,
1927), 21 A. J. INT'L L. 777 (1927); United States ex rel. Hopkins v. United
Mexican States (General Claims Comm'n, U.S. and Mexico, 1926), 21 AM. J. INT'L
L. 160 (1927) ; Silvanie, supra note 357.
1967
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
telegraph are government services), the sale of railroad tickets
(where railroads are operated by the government), the registration
of births, deaths, and marriages, . . . many rulings by the police,
and the collection of several types of taxes.1 39 3 Acts of the rebel
government, in its personal character, however, did not bind the
State, except to the extent that it benefitted thereby. 94 Included
among the acts classified as personal, are the borrowing of money,
purchase of war materials, and the forcible taking of property.39 5
More recently, two West German courts had occasion to dis-
agree about the status of currency printed in West Germany for
the illegal government of Rhodesia. The Frankfort public prosecu-
tor had ordered the currency to be impounded. A civil court upheld
his action, on the ground that the currency, bearing the signature
of a member of the illegal government, was forged, and had not
been ordered by an authorized official. 9" A criminal court, how-
ever, ruled that the currency was not forged.
3 9 7
b. Attributing Legal Effects to the Acts of Non-Recognized
Governments - A Proposed Standard.
The express and implied principles of continuity of the State
operate in essentially the same manner, when applied to the acts of a
non-recognized, usurping government. That is to say, each one estab-
lishes a standard of representative recognition. 39 8 Both principles con-
sider the de facto power to have legal capacity only as a conservator
for the recognized government, exercising purely ministerial powers.
Hence, they attribute legal effect only to acts performed by it in its
representative capacity. Correlatively, they deny legal effect to all
acts performed by it on its own behalf, as an entity distinct from the
recognized government.
Since the standard of representative recognition attributes legal
effect only to those acts performed by the de facto power as the
representative, in law, of the recognized government, its application,
ipso facto, cannot constitute recognition of the de facto power as
an independent government. Hence, it neither can affront the
393 United States ex rel. Hopkins v. United Mexican States (General Claims Comm'n,
U.S. and Mexico, 1926), 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 160 (1927).
39 United States ex rel. Hopkins v. United Mexican States General Claims Comm'n,
U.S. and Mexico, 1926), 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 160, (1927); Davies v. Mexico (Gen-
eral Claims Comm'n, U.S. and Mexico, 1927), 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 777 (1927);
Cook v. Mexico (General Claims Comm'n, U.S. and Mexico, 1927), 22 AM. J. INTL
L. 189 (1928) ; Silvanie, supra note 357.
395 Silvanie, supra note 357.
396 N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1966, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
397 Id.
398 Although the principle of representation is explicit only in "continuity of the State,"




recognized government, nor subvert a policy of non-recognition.
Consequently, this standard properly is applicable in undetermined
non-recognition situations. It accords with the reasoning upon which
the constitutive theory of recognition is based. It is, however, nar-
rower in scope than the objective realities theory of recognition.
The standard of representative recognition, like that of objec-
tive realities, gives legal effect to all acts of governmental routine
performed by the de facto power. It would, therefore, give legal
effect to the execution, by officials of the non-recognized regime,
of such documents as birth certificates, powers of attorney, and
affidavits. Both standards, moreover, would give effect to laws
'necessary to peace and good order among citizens" and to the ordi-
nary conduct of their daily life. Laws of this type include those
relating to status, personality, wills, descent and distribution, trans-
fer of property, contracts, injuries to persons and property, and
currency regulation.
At this point, the standards diverge. In the first place, it is
possible that representative recognition warrants giving legal effect
only to those laws which substantially conform, with respect to
their form, content and enforcement, to their counterparts existing
under the recognized government. The objective realities theory
contains no such limitation. The latter theory, for example, would
view corporations, created by an unrecognized, but effective govern-
ment, as having legal existence, irrespective of the conformity of
the incorporation laws to those of the recognized government. 9 '
Yet, those cases which based their acknowledgment of the legal
existence of such corporations on the former theory, predicated
their decisions on the continued existence of the incorporation laws
of the recognized government,4"0 or on laws substantially similar
thereto."1" Thus, the English courts recently gave legal effect to
acts of the non-recognized East German government, on the theory
that it had performed these acts as the representative of the U.S.S.R.;
the latter being recognized by England as the de jure government
of East Germany.4"2
Secondly, the objective realities theory gives legal effect to
confiscations, by the de facto power, of property within its control
39SUpright v. Mercury Business Mach. Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417
(1961).
40°Dahan & Dorra Bros. v. Tchoureff, Case No. 34 (Egypt Ct. App. 1st. Chamber,
June 1936) reprinted in 1935-1937 LAUTERPACHT, ANN. DIG. & REPORTS OF PUBLIC
INT'L LAW CASES at 115. See also Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler, Ltd. (No.
2), [1966] 3 W.L.R. 125 (H.L.); Greig, The Carl-Zeiss Case and the Position of an
Unrecognized Government in English Law, 83 LAw Q. REV. 96 (1967).
4o United States v. Insurance Cos., 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 99 (1874).
4WCarl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler, Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 W.L.R. 125 (H.L.).
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at the time of the confiscation.4"' Representative recognition, how-
ever, denies legal effect to such confiscations, unless, perhaps, com-
pensation is paid therefor.4"4
Thirdly, the objective realities theory conceivably might per-
mit the de facto power, or its creatures, to maintain an action in
the courts of the non-recognizing State.40 5 Representative recogni-
tion, however, precludes this derogation of the rights of the recog-
nized government.
The limitations of representative recognition, as compared to
the objective realities theory, do not appear, however, to be so
onerous as to constitute a denial of individual justice. Moreover,
use of the standard of representative recognition eliminates the
possibility that the consequences of legality of statehood or govern-
ment will be attributed to non-recognition situations which public
policy bars from being characterized as legal. For, representative
recognition gives legal effect to the acts of a non-recognized State
or government by treating them as the acts of a recognized State or
government, rather than as the acts of an entity distinct from the
recognized State or government. This is in conformity with the
operation of the de facto public officer doctrine, which treats a
purported public officer as de facto only if he assumes to act under
lawful appointment and in a lawful manner. Otherwise, he is
treated as a usurper.
5. Legal Illegality in International Law- A Recapitulation
Legal illegality manifests itself, in international law, as the
attribution of the consequences of legality of statehood or govern-
ment to non-recognized international entities. Assuming that this
attribution is determined by a standard of representative recognition,
it is possible to classify the juridical constructions of statehood and
government, as required by the doctrine of relative recognition.
All recognized States and governments are juridical construc-
tions of the first degree: For, attribution to them of the conse-
quences of legality is barrable by no one. Non-recognized inter-
national entities, to which the standard of representative recognition
is applicable, are classifiable as juridical constructions of the third
degree. For, the attribution to them, of the consequences of legalty"
of statehood or government, can be barred only by a limited num-
4
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404Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1877); Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee and
Parker v. Davis), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
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ber of persons, and only in a limited manner. To wit, it can be
barred by directive of the political department of the forum, or by
unilateral action of the judiciary of the forum.
Relative recognition, therefore, is as functional in the sphere
.)f international law, as it is in the sphere of municipal law. It
eliminates the paradox of legal illegality from both spheres of law.
